To prosper, organizational psychology should... adopt a global perspective

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Summary

We argue that for the field of organizational psychology to prosper, it must adopt a global perspective. In this article, we discuss three specific ideals for a more global organizational psychology, our progress toward these ideals (or lack thereof), and potential solutions to move toward a truly global science. First, we argue that a truly global organizational psychology must incorporate global voices. Yet cross-cultural research in organizational psychology still remains largely a U.S. export business wherein the very questions we ask are colored by Western assumptions and values which are then explored to other cultures. To be a global science, we must acknowledge that the questions we ask are value-laden, and we must ensure that the questions we ask to have global relevance. Second, a truly global organizational psychology must articulate with precision the level at which culture operates. Yet the level at which culture is defined varies widely across studies and levels of analysis confusion abounds in the literature. We discuss a number of conceptualizations and measures of culture and suggest the conditions under which each may be warranted. Third, a truly global organizational psychology must advance an understanding of when culture matters. Despite abundant evidence that behavior in organizations is influenced by multiple contextual factors (e.g., the work team, organization, industry), we have little understanding of how national culture and non-cultural factors jointly influence behavior in organizations. We discuss several promising models to guide such efforts. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Introduction

The field of organizational psychology (as well as allied fields such as human resources management and organizational behavior) has experienced a global paradigm shift of unprecedented proportions. Starting in the 1970s, scholars began to question the exclusive reliance on Western theories and samples to capture global organizational realities. In their Handbook of Industrial and Organizational Psychology chapter, Barrett and Bass (1976) provided the field with a wake-up call, arguing that restricting the field to Western cultural contexts “puts constraints upon both our theories and our practical solutions to organizational problems” (p. 1675). Since then, theories on dimensions of cultural variation have proliferated (Hofstede, 1980; House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman, & Gupta, 2004; Leung et al., 2002; Schwartz, 1994), methodological pitfalls and prospects for cross-cultural
research have been clearly articulated (Van de Vijver & Leung, 1997), and the volume of cross-cultural research across all areas of organizational psychology has increased exponentially.

This global paradigm shift is occurring at the micro level, with culture being infused into theories and research on work motivation (Erez & Earley, 1993), job attitudes (Van de Vliert & Janssens, 2002), justice (Brockner et al., 2001), and work performance (Farh, Earley, & Lin, 1997); at the meso level with increased attention to cultural influences on leadership (House et al., 2004), conflict (Tinsley, 1998), negotiation (Gelfand & Brett, 2004), and teams (Kirkman & Shapiro, 1997); and at the macro level, with increased attention to the effect of national culture on organizational culture (Brodbbeck, Hanges, Dickson, Gupta, & Dorfman, 2004), human resource management practices (Aycan, Kanungo, & Sinha, 1999), and international joint ventures (Isobe, Makino, & Montgomery, 2000). This shift is also evident in a number of less obvious ways, including increased representation of Non-Western scholars on editorial boards (Rynes, 2005), increases in cross-cultural journals (International Journal of Cross-Cultural Management, Management and Organizational Review), and special issues devoted to cross-cultural topics in top tier journals. Perhaps not surprisingly, many scholars have expressed unbridled optimism about this global shift, referring to it as “a new era” (Gelfand, Erez, & Aycan, 2007) and “the golden age” for the study of culture in the organizational sciences (Kirkman & Law, 2005).

Despite this rapid progress, the field of organizational psychology is still far from reaching its global ideals. In this article, we discuss three ideals for cross-cultural organizational psychology (CCOP), our current progress toward these ideals (or lack thereof), and potential solutions for breaking more global ground. First, we argue that a truly global organizational science must incorporate global voices. Yet as we discuss below, CCOP still remains a US export business insomuch as the questions we ask are largely colored by Western assumptions and values which are then exported to other cultures. To be a global science, CCOP must acknowledge that the questions asked are often value-laden, and we must ensure that the questions we ask have global relevance. Second, a truly global organizational science must articulate with precision the level at which culture operates. Yet, the level at which culture is defined varies widely across studies and levels of analysis confusion abounds in the literature. CCOP needs to articulate a precise and multifaceted view of the level of culture, and the conditions under which different conceptualizations and measures are warranted. Third, a truly global organizational psychology must advance an understanding of when culture matters. Despite abundant evidence that behavior in organizations is influenced by multiple contextual factors (e.g., the work team, organization, industry), we have little understanding of how national culture interacts with other contextual factors to predict organizational phenomena. Instead, the literature in CCOP tends to ignore these factors and presents a largely decontextualized view of human behavior in organizations. Accordingly, CCOP must begin to model context into its theories in order to understand how cultural and non-cultural factors simultaneously influence organizational behavior phenomena. Although these need not be the only ideals for CCOP (see also Gelfand et al., 2007; Leung, Bhagat, Buchan, Erez, & Gibson, 2005), we argue that they reflect fundamental (and often implicit) neglected issues that if addressed will help organizational psychology truly reach its global potential.

A Global Organizational Psychology Captures Global Voices: Expanding the Questions Asked in Cross-Cultural Organizational Psychology

How do organizational scholars come to decide what research questions do and do not need to be asked? In their text, What to Study: Generating and Developing Research Questions, Campbell, Daft,
and Hulin (1982) noted that the research questions we ask are not necessarily the ones that most need to be asked. Rather, the questions scholars ask are based on a variety of factors (e.g., personal interest, probability of publication, scholarly context) that do not necessarily reflect the needs of the field. In this section, we draw inspiration from Campbell et al. to explore how one particular factor—the cultural background of researchers—may lead to systematic disparities between what is asked and what needs to be asked.

The idea that researchers’ backgrounds influence their work is not new. Indeed, philosophers of science long have noted how social and historical contexts shape the research that scholars conduct. Kuhn (1962), for instance, developed the paradigmatic model of scientific pursuit on the grounds that science is not a linear, decontextualized progression of thought, but rather a shifting reflection of social and historical contexts. Under this more contextualized model, the values, moralities, and worldviews of scholars shape the direction and nature of their research. To quote Lefkowitz (2003), it is possible to come to the conclusion that, in fact, “all scientific research is often value-laden” (p. 211). Of course, there are many aspects of researchers’ backgrounds that shape their scholarly paths. Culture, however, is an especially potent factor to examine given that CCOP has developed within an almost entirely monocultural context. For instance, among the 93 studies in Tsui, Nifadkar, and Ou’s (2007) recent literature review of CCOP, a full 86 per cent of the studies’ first authors are from Western countries. Ten of the remaining 13 articles’ first authors are from East Asia, leaving only three papers with first authors from Latin America, Africa, or the Middle East. Thus, even within a field specifically developed to combat the problems associated with Western hegemony, Western biases can still exist.

Central to our argument is the idea that “modern science emerged within a particular sociohistorical context [in which] the values of liberalism, individualism, capitalism, and male dominance were primary” (Sampson, 1978, pp. 1334–1335). In other words, the social context within which organizational psychology has developed is not agnostic, but laden with culture-specific sociopolitical realities and values systems that in turn affect the questions scholars ask. If organizational psychology as a field seeks to become truly global, it must extricate itself from its Western roots and begin to ask questions that reflect the values, realities, and needs of the Nonwestern world.

In an effort to move toward a truly global organizational psychology, we describe three ways in which Western values and socio-political realities may be affecting the scientific priorities in the field of CCOP. We first discuss how the very questions asked in CCOP reflect the Western assumption that individuals are largely independent and have freedom of choice. We next turn to how the postmaterialistic nature of Western society is reflected in the questions asked in CCOP, with a priority given to theories and research concerning self-actualization versus the fulfillment of basic needs. As one more illustrative example of the way in which values affect scientific priorities in CCOP, we discuss how the Western endorsement of a Protestant Relational Ideology (Sanchez-Burkes, 2005) and the assumptions of highly distinct boundaries among spheres of life, leads to the neglect of research questions that prioritize the overlap of family, friendship, and religion with organizational life as found in Non-Western cultures. In all, in the tradition of Campbell et al. (1982), we hope that by acknowledging that societal values, assumptions, and socio-political realities guide the questions we ask, we can begin to expand the global relevance of our inquiries, and ask the ever-important question, “What questions should we be asking?”

Research questions prioritize the cultural model of the independent self

Since the rise of Greek society, Western civilization has maintained a distinct culture of independence and autonomy. The Greeks themselves displayed a strong sense of personal agency, and were “imbued
with a sense of choice and an absence of social constraint that were unparalleled in the ancient world” (Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001, p. 292). Indeed, the history of Western civilization is rife with assertions of independence, from the Protestant reformation’s “appeal to individualism” (Sampson, 1978, p. 1335) to the founding of the United States, with its distinct fondness for personal freedom, autonomy, and individual rights (Tocqueville, 2003). The cultural model of the self—reinforced through a variety of cultural institutions—dictates that it is a cultural imperative that individuals define their own internal attributes, become skilled in making choices for themselves, and fulfill their own needs and desires in the pursuit of happiness (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1989).

In line with our thesis that cultural values in part dictate the questions that are prioritized in organizational psychology, a perusal of the literature reveals that many questions asked reflect the cultural model of the independent self. The focus on the individual—and ways in which individuals vary—is evident in the large research industry on individual differences. Nearly every research program is examined through an individual differences perspective, including leadership (Zaccaro, 2007), performance (Judge, Thoresen, & Bono, 2001), job satisfaction (Judge, Heller & Mount, 2002), aggression (Douglas & Martinko, 2001), organizational citizenship behaviors (Kamdar, McAllister, & Turban, 2006), expatriation (Shaffer, Harrison, Gregersen, Black, & Ferzandi, 2006), and entrepreneurship (Zhao & Seibert, 2006), among others. Put simply, research questions continue to reflect the prevailing concern with individual differences, driven in part by the assumption that individual abilities and personality are primary causes of action.

Similarly, many research paradigms in organizational psychology have at their basis the idea that people are free to choose what they do and when they do it. Theories of vocational choice presume that individuals engage in a highly self-reflective process, generally free from situational constraint (Holland, 1959). Moreover, the attraction-selection-attrition (ASA) model similarly posits that potential employees are attracted to a company and, since they are free to act as they wish, apply and leave if they feel a lack of fit (e.g., Schneider, 1987). This preoccupation with personal choice is likewise reflected in the Western conceptualization of PE fit, which focuses on employees freely choosing the best companies to work for and organizations freely choosing the best employees (e.g., Judge & Ostroff, 2007).

Finally, many models and research questions in organizational psychology assume that people will use those freedoms to fulfill their own personal needs in the pursuit of happiness. In other words, they assume that people will inevitably ask the question, “What’s in it for me?” VIE theory and equity theory, for instance, both highlight the Western assumption of and preoccupation with personal need fulfillment. With VIE theory, it is assumed that employees are focused on what’s best for themselves, and that employees will therefore work hard only if they think such work will lead them to more pay, happiness, and other favorable individual outcomes (Vroom, 1964). Similarly, equity theory supposes that people expect to receive personal rewards that are commensurate with their inputs (Adams, 1965). The Western preoccupation with job satisfaction, referred to as “one of the best researched concepts in work and organizational psychology,” provides further evidence that the pursuit of happiness is a central research concern in the field (Dormann & Zapf, 2001, p. 483). In all, the underlying assumption is that people both have personal desires and are prone to use rational thought to obtain them, as a means to ultimately increase their happiness. It is interesting to note that such self-focused orientations appear not only to be assumed, but also to be value-laden, insomuch as people who do not care about their personal wants and needs might be perceived as either unmotivated or conformist.

These questions and traditions, which reflect the cultural model of the independent self, however, may not be as relevant in other cultural contexts where models of interdependence are more predominant. The cultural model of interdependence has an entirely different cultural mandate, namely
that individuals are highly attentive to situational contexts and adjust their behavior to fit their surroundings, are motivated by the choices and opinions of others, and that duties and fulfilling obligations are more important than individual choice and rights. Chinese culture, for instance, is rooted in a strong history of group cooperation and harmony, wherein “the behavior of the individual should be guided by the expectations of the group” (Nisbett et al., 2001, p. 292). For example, East Asian children are strongly motivated by their parents’ opinions (Iyengar & Lepper, 1999). In the Middle East and Africa, family, friends, and social expectations are likely to exert much more of a powerful influence on employees as compared to Western contexts (e.g., Budhwar & Mellahi, 2006; Kamoche, Nyambegera, & Mulinge, 2004). Accordingly, research questions that reflect these realities are likely to differ from what is prioritized in Western contexts. For example, rather than developing taxonomies of individual differences, research might ask the question, “What are the dimensions of situations and contexts to which individuals must adapt?” Instead of a five-factor model of personality, a global organizational science might prioritize the development of a five-factor model of situations or relationships. Likewise, whereas Western scholars are likely to assume free choice, new paradigms might be developed that focus on contextual choice. Under a paradigm of contextual choice, researchers might study how managers’ expectations affect employees’ decisions, how family perceptions of an employee’s job influence turnover decisions, how a leader’s guanxi network affects follower attitudes, or how employees adjust to (rather than fit with) an organizational environment. Finally, instead of a focus on personal need fulfillment, questions and paradigms might be developed regarding relational need fulfillment. Kim (1999) notes, for instance, how indigenous Korean constructs such as Kye involve a strong focus on helping other people achieve their goals and needs. Gupta (1999) similarly discusses Indians’ orientation toward the needs of their families and castes. Thus, instead of studying personal satisfaction, new paradigms might be developed to understand how the satisfaction of others (e.g., spouses, leaders, co-workers) serves as a motivator of employees’ behavior. In all, given that extant cultural values and worldviews influence the questions asked and paradigms developed, it is especially critical in CCOP to ask new questions rather than export the questions that are tightly aligned with Western values and assumptions.

Research questions assume a postmaterialist worldview

Modern organizational psychology science has developed not only within a context of independence and autonomy, but also within a context of wealth, industrialization, and social tranquility. Whereas a significant portion of the global community lives with the daily realities of poverty, conflict, and corruption, the world’s population of scientists and scholars is more shielded, generally living in only the most wealthy and conflict-free environments. As noted by Nobel Laureate Ahmed Zewail (2004), “70–80 per cent of the world’s population living largely in developing countries [has] contributed less than 7 per cent of . . . [recent] scientific articles” (p. 1). We refer to the wealthy and industrialized context of Western science as “postmaterialism,” a term derived from Inglehart’s (2000) discussion of materialist versus postmaterialist values. Whereas materialist values emphasize “economic and physical security,” postmaterialist values emphasize “self-expression, subjective well-being, and quality of life” (p. 84).

There is little doubt that even the field of CCOP, which seeks to capture global realities, is primarily based within postmaterialist settings. We did a statistical analysis of Tsui et al.’s (2007) report of authors of CCOP studies against the Human Development Index (HDI), which rank-orders nations in an aggregate index of life expectancy, GDP, and literacy rates (Human Development Index rankings, 2008). Remarkably, a full 100 per cent of the 69 unique first authors from Tsui et al. (2007) are from countries characterized by the HDI as having “high human development.” Further, the number of
authored articles per country is significantly correlated with HDI rankings at $p < .001$. The correlation becomes stronger when the United States is excluded from the calculation, suggesting that the trend is driven by more than the United States’ scientific hegemony. Thus, modern organizational psychology has developed within a wealthy, industrialized, and stable context.

What is less obvious and of central concern in this paper is how the postmaterialistic context in which CCOP is developing is shaping the questions that are being asked and the questions that remain unasked. At the most basic level, the reality of postmaterialism and its associated affluence and socio-political stability afford a research focus on self-actualization needs as compared to basic need fulfillment and safety needs. Consider, for instance, the Western paradigms for training and selection. Selection research focuses on the objectivity (De Corte, Lievens, & Sackett, 2006) and predictive validity (Kuncel, Hezlett, & Ones, 2001) of selection systems, with little consideration for the basic needs of the applicant. Western researchers generally assume a highly educated workforce, and therefore focus on advanced skills such as decision-making, leadership, and team-building over basic education and competency training (Arthur, Bennett, Edens, & Bell, 2003). Even basic needs are often examined as a means to self-actualization. Pay, for instance, is seen as a cause of intrinsic motivation and self-worth (e.g., Fox, Scott, & Donohue, 1993; Jenkins, Mitra, Gupta, & Shaw, 1998), rather than as a vital survival need and end in and of itself.

Take also for example, another important feature of post-materialist societies that infiltrates the questions asked (and unasked) in organizational psychology. The U.S. has historically enjoyed a (relatively speaking) peaceful society with little turmoil and violence between groups. In the absence of such turmoil, modern organizational psychology has developed under the assumption that historical factors, for example, age-old animosities between groups, does not matter. Instead of asking how history affects interpersonal and inter-group processes, these historical considerations remain absent in our theories and research. The aggression literature, for instance, has focused on antecedents including negative affectivity, justice perceptions and job satisfaction, and has largely ignored historical causes of aggression (Hershcovis et al., 2007). Similarly, diversity is examined through lenses including individualism/collectivism (Chatman, Polzer, Barsade, & Neale, 1998), social identity theory (Joshi, Liao, & Jackson, 2006), and value-in-differences perspectives (Cox, Lobel, & McLeod, 1991). Little consideration is given to the possibility that ethnic groups in organizations could feel overt, conscious, and historically motivated hatred toward other groups, and engage in overt discrimination (which is not subject to the same legal ramifications as in postmaterialist societies), especially in countries that have suffered from recent conflict (e.g., Baruch, Meshoulam, & Tzafrir, 2005). Studies of intercultural interactions in research on expatriate management (Bhaskar-Shrinivas, Harrison, Shaffer, & Luk, 2005), international joint ventures (Barkema and Vermeulen, 1997), and negotiation (Gelfand & Brett, 2004) have likewise exhibited a bias toward values and identity perspectives over power dynamics and historical animosities.

The question we raise is whether the questions and models developed in CCOP reflect the realities of the materialist world, with its conditions of limited affluence and socio-political turmoil. Questions deemed important in these context, rather than being derived from the assumption of self-actualization, might focus on basic need fulfillment. The science of job security and unemployment might take precedence over the science of job satisfaction and commitment; the criteria for selection systems might focus less on objectivity and validity, and more on the legitimization of subjectivity and nepotism. As noted by Blunt and Popoola (1985), “In settings where paid work is scarce, and where there are strong pressures to allocate jobs in a particularistic fashion, the selection process constitutes a prime means for fulfilling one’s obligations to kin and other personal contacts” (p. 85). The focus of training, for example, might be on basic skills such as literacy. In addition, questions that incorporate historical realities might loom larger in research questions in materialistic societies. Research has shown, for instance, that people are most affected by the historical context when it is both relevant and salient (as when faced with an
enemy from a recent war; Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 1998; see also Liu & Hilton, 2005). Therefore, in more tumultuous developing nations questions regarding historically motivated social cognition might loom larger in studies of motivation, interpersonal relations, and leadership, among other topics. We do not mean to imply that the questions asked within the current tradition are not important. Rather, in order to build a truly global organizational science, we need to expand the questions we ask to fit with the realities of other societal contexts.

Research questions reflect a protestant relational ideology: the assumption of boundaries

In Western society, employees’ personal and professional lives are seen as distinct, bounded, and separate. This perception can be traced as far back as Aristotle, who felt that utilitarian relationships—such as those formed between co-workers—cannot be true friendships since they are based on what the individuals can do for each other rather than on their personal preferences or feelings (Vernon, 2005). Western industrialization and capitalism drove a deeper divide between the personal and professional spheres by causing employees to focus on work and therefore “differentiating more sharply ‘work’ and ‘life’” (Gupta, 1999, p. 103). In the United States, norms of work/life separation can more recently be traced to the Protestant Relational Ideology, defined as a “deep-seated belief that affective and relational concerns are considered inappropriate in work settings and, therefore, are to be given less attention than in social, non-work settings” (Sanchez-Burks, 2005, p. 265). And as with other societal values and assumptions, we would argue that these cultural realities affect the questions that are asked (and unasked) in organizational psychology, and have resulted in less attention being given to the influence of friendships and multiplex ties in organizations and the integration of organizational life with other domains of life (e.g., religion).

For example, central to the Western conceptualization of work and personal spheres as separate is the notion that work colleagues are distinct from family and friends. Indeed, Western scholars have been hesitant to examine personal relationships at work, causing one scholar to note that “existing research is limited on the blended friendship of work associates” (Bridge & Baxter, 1992, p. 201). In areas such as selection, the blurring of professional and personal relationships is seen as unprofessional and even corrupt (e.g., Ashforth & Anand, 2003). In other areas, such as leadership theory, the role of friendship is similarly seen as misplaced. Graen and Uhl-Bien (1995), for instance, note that leader-member exchange relationship development “is based on the characteristics of the working relationship as opposed to a personal or friendship relationship” (p. 237). This assumption of uniplex ties influences the questions asked in work/family research as well. Frone, Russell, & Cooper’s (1992) work/family interface model, for instance, hypothesizes that work only affects family satisfaction insomuch as work stressors interfere with family life. In other words, many paradigms assume uniplex ties in organizations, and do not allow for the possibility that one might work with family members and close friends which might affect behavior both inside and outside of organizations (Ford, Heinen, & Langkamer, 2007).

Despite the prevalence of work/life boundary concerns in the West, cross-cultural evidence suggests a markedly different trend in other cultures, where multiplex ties that combine friendship, family, and work are common. Iranian scholars have noted that “employees view their managers as sympathetic brothers and sisters or compassionate fathers and mothers who [are] frequently involved in their employees’ private lives and family matters” (Namazie & Tayeb, 2006, p. 29). Davila and Elvira (2005) similarly note that “‘family’ is the metaphor used by management for leading Latin American firms” (p. 7). The concept of paternalistic leadership is similarly common in Nonwestern countries, where “the role of the superior is to provide care, protection, and guidance to the subordinate both in work and non-work domains” (Aycan, 2006, p. 446). Indeed, coworkers are often not only treated as
family—they are family. In Central America, for instance, “most local companies tend to be run by families” (Osland & Osland, 2005, p. 135). In India, Sheth (1968) notes that “there is nothing wrong in the top officials favoring their relatives and castemen. . . If [they] do not benefit from the authority you possess, what use are you to society?” (p. 90). Thus, whereas Western researchers often focus on exchange relationships at work and spillover effects between separate spheres of work and home, research in Non-Western contexts needs to focus on relational dynamics at work and the consequences of inevitably overlapping personal and work ties.

Just as Westerners perceive work and personal relationships as separate, work and religion are also seen as distinct. Put simply, religion at work is seldom studied in organizational psychology. The absence of religion in Western organizational research is driven not only by social norms and customs, but by legal regulations as well. Although U.S. law allows for personal religious expression, it inhibits the development of overtly religious environments on the grounds that they might discriminate against employees from different backgrounds. Even the limited Western research on workplace spirituality that does exist generally takes an individual-level values approach, focusing on inner feelings of spirituality instead of overt religious expression (e.g., Ashmos & Duchon, 2000; Weaver & Agle, 2002).

By contrast, the boundaries between religion and work are less distinct in other cultures. In Latin America, religious images, alters, and sculptures are commonplace in the workplace, and employees “expect freedom to express their faith in public” (Davila & Elvira, 2005, p. 10). Likewise, as noted by Budhwar and Mellahi (2006), there is an “immense impact of Islamic values, Islamic work ethics, and Islamic principles on the management of HR in Islamic countries” (p. 7). In many Islamic countries, for example, the religious practice of shura highlights the importance of achieving group consensus during decision-making (Mellahi, 2006). In Ghana, spiritual traditions that emphasize a culture of forgiveness in the workplace affect managers’ attitudes toward punishment, who “often fail to invoke disciplinary action against employees for even gross misconduct because they do not want to incur the wrath of the employees and become unpopular in the organization” (Debrah, 2001, p. 198). Thus, whereas Western researchers generally conceptualize religion as a private matter, and therefore generally not relevant to organizational phenomena, religious artifacts and practices are highly relevant and public in organizations in other cultures. In all, as compared to sharp boundaries between domains of life in the West, in other cultures, work, family, religion, and leisure, among other domains, are likely to overlap, necessitating new research questions to be asked with these realities in mind.

In sum, organizational psychology will only be as global as the voices it incorporates. Values guide the development of all sciences, and CCOP is no exception. As a starting point, we must be mindful that the very questions we ask often reflect societal values, assumptions, and socio-political realities. We must be skeptical of simply exporting questions that have relevance in our own contexts, and we must be mindful that there are likely many unasked questions that may be equally if not more important in other societal contexts.

A Global Organizational Psychology Articulates Where Culture Operates: Integrating Levels of Analysis Issues into Cross-Cultural Organizational Scholarship

Regardless of the questions asked, research in CCOP must have a clear conceptualization of culture that underlies the theory being advanced. During the past several years, organizational science has witnessed an explosion of interest in levels of analysis (e.g., House et al., 2004; Klein & Kozlowski,
Yet, levels of analysis considerations have received surprisingly little attention in CCOP, causing theoretical and empirical confusion in the literature. More specifically, in CCOP research, the level at which culture is defined varies across different studies, yet often studies are equated as examining the same phenomenon. As an example, consider the extant body of literature on power distance and procedural justice. On the one hand, research has examined individual differences in power distance within a single country and whether they moderate the impact of voice on justice perceptions (Lee, Pillutla, & Law, 2000; Lam, Schaubroeck, & Aryee, 2002). In these investigations, culture is defined at the individual level, and the societal context of power distance is not of interest. At the same time, using the same labels, others have defined culture using country as the classifying variable, while ignoring the role of individual differences. For example, Price, Hall, van den Bos, Hunton, Lovett, & Tippett (2001) used country as a proxy for culture, and explored its impact on the relationship between voice and perceptions of fairness across four cultural contexts (i.e., Great Britain, Mexico, U.S., Netherlands). Still others have examined individual differences in power distance beliefs as a mediator of country level effects (Brockner et al., 2001).

Although each of these studies defines culture at a potentially meaningful level of analysis, inconsistencies across research studies have impeded the development of a global organizational science in a number of ways. First, seemingly similar studies are not comparable if the level at which culture is defined varies across studies. For example, consider one study that defines collectivism as an individual-level value, and one study that defines culture as the country-level mean of individual collectivism scores. Both studies define culture as collectivism, yet assuming that culture has the same meaning in each study requires that the construct of collectivism is isomorphic across levels of analysis. Assumptions of culture as isomorphic across levels of analysis, however, are highly dubious, given that levels of analysis theorists agree that true isomorphism is likely a rare phenomenon (Bliese, 2000; House, Rousseau, & Thomas-Hunt, 1995; Kozlowski & Klein, 2000; Morgeson & Hofmann, 1999). Moreover, research that applies the same construct across levels typically fails to specify the different processes at each level that are producing the effects. For example, collectivism has been linked to resistance to teams at the individual (Kirkman & Shapiro, 1997) and team levels (Kirkman & Shapiro, 2001), yet the meaning of these constructs at different levels, and the processes that produce effects generally remain unspecified. Finally, a lack of attention to levels in the cross-cultural literature limits the breadth of potential theoretical and empirical lenses through which culture might be relevant to organizational phenomena. For example, levels researchers have long recognized a variety of models for aggregating individual-level constructs to the group level (e.g., additive, direct consensus, referent-shift), each of which carries with it a unique set of underlying assumptions (Chan, 1998). Although aggregate definitions of culture have predominantly taken the additive approach, other compositional models of culture may be more appropriate (e.g., dispersion).

Suggestions for incorporating levels issues into CCOP

The confusion regarding the level of culture that currently pervades cross-cultural research is not surprising, given that defining the appropriate level of culture is a complex issue. To bring more clarity to the level at which culture is defined in CCOP research, in the following section we draw upon and expand Chan’s (1998) terminology for understanding culture at different levels of analysis. We discuss key assumptions associated with conceptualizations at each level, and what they imply for measurement. We discuss the conditions under which each conceptualization might be fruitful versus problematic in cross-cultural research. We explicitly use different terminology at different levels in order to help reduce confusion and inconsistency regarding the level of culture. And we emphasize that...
while there is no ‘right’ definition of culture, the level at which culture is defined and ultimately measured should be determined theoretically and made explicit.

**Individual level**

We first discuss individual level measures of culture, differentiating conceptualizations and associated measures of individuals’ values, attitudes, or beliefs from individuals perception of the dominant values, attitudes, and beliefs of their cultural groups. We also discuss the notion of cultural frog-pond effects, or the difference between an individual’s values, attitudes, and beliefs and the dominant group. Each has a different meaning and implies different measurements for use in cross-cultural research.

**Psychological culture**

The first individual-level definition of culture we discuss is what could be referred to as psychological culture. In this definition of culture, individuals are asked to report on their personal values, attitudes, or beliefs, making the individual, not the culture, the referent (e.g., I value X). In this conceptualization, culture is treated as an individual level construct, and is not aggregated to a higher level. The key assumptions underlying the notion of psychological culture include that (1) the individuals included in the sample of interest vary in their values, attitudes, or beliefs and (2) values are not necessarily shared within the subgroups of the sample.

Under certain conditions, a psychological culture conceptualization is an appropriate means for assessing culture. For example, when studying work units with employees from a wide variety of cultural backgrounds it is reasonable to assume that there will be significant variation in cultural values, beliefs, and attitudes. Similarly, some variation is also expected when sampling from a single country, especially when the culture of that country is loose. The personal values model becomes potentially problematic, however, when sampling from multiple cultures (e.g., two or more countries; e.g., Lam et al., 2002). If the meaning of the individual values within the sample is affected systematically by higher-level factors (e.g., countries, ethnic membership), failing to account for the higher-level source of cultural meaning is problematic because it will result in biased parameter estimates (e.g., Bliese & Hanges, 2004).

**Subjective cultural press**

The second individual-level definition of culture we discuss is subjective cultural press, which we define as individual differences in perceptions of cultural values, attitudes, and/or norms. Like personal values, subjective cultural press is an individual-level definition of culture. Unlike personal values, however, subjective cultural press is measured using the culture as the referent (e.g., People in this culture value X). The key assumptions that underlie definitions of culture as subjective cultural press include that (1) individuals are aware of norms for what is valued and expected in their culture and (2) individuals within the same culture vary in their perceptions of cultural norms.

Subjective culture press at the individual level can be an appropriate model for assessing culture for researchers who theorize that perceptions of the society have motivational force, but that this varies by individuals. Moreover, subjective cultural press will be an appropriate definition of culture when researchers theorize that a feature of either the culture of interest or the individuals within that culture results in within culture variation in perceptions of cultural norms. For example, certain individuals, such as those high on need for closure, may be more attuned to the environment and therefore are more
affected by the norms of the culture (Chiu, Morris, Hong, & Menon, 2000). However, as with psychological culture, perceived cultural press becomes potentially problematic when individuals are sampled from more than one culture and the nesting of individuals within cultures is not accounted for statistically. Moreover, in tight societies or societies in which there is little individual variation in need for closure, for example, there will be less variation in perceived cultural press.

**Cultural frog pond**

The third definition of culture we discuss is the *cultural frog pond* (e.g., Klein, Dansereau, & Hall, 1994; Kozlowski & Klein, 2000). Cultural frog ponds examine individual values, attitudes, and beliefs in comparison to the mean levels of such constructs in the prevailing culture. Like the personal values model, cultural frog ponds are measured in terms of individual constructs (e.g., *I value X*). Unlike the personal values model, however, cultural frog ponds are assessed as the difference between an individual’s value and the mean of the same value across members of that type of unit-level subjective culture. Thus, cultural frog ponds reflect an individual’s values in relation to the aggregate values of all cultural members. The key assumptions that underlie the cultural frog pond model of culture include that (1) personal values vary within cultures and (2) culture operates through the comparison of personal values with the values of the culture as a whole.

Cultural frog ponds are appropriate for a variety of research questions. For example, the congruence of one’s own values with the dominant values might be an important predictor of organizational phenomena. Van Vianen, De Pater, Kristof-Brown, and Johnson (2004) found that Schwartz’s cultural value of self-transcendence predicted work adjustment and interaction adjustment when operationalized as the congruence between an expatriate’s values and the perceived normative values of the host country. Likewise, cultural frog pond effects might be important to examine in conditions where a given score on a personal value is theorized to have different effects across contexts. For example, consider the effects of individual level scores on individualism in both an individualistic country, such as the United States (individualism score = 91; Hofstede, 1980) and a collectivistic country, such as Taiwan (individualism score = 17; Hofstede, 1980). An individual who places a moderate value on individualism would be viewed as not very individualistic in the United States, but as highly individualistic in Taiwan. In turn, the individual’s degree of individualism in relation to what is normative in that culture may have different implications for how that individual is perceived and how he or she behaves. As with the other two individual-level definitions of culture—personal values and subjective cultural press—there are conditions in which a cultural frog pond definition of culture is more problematic. For example, in highly homogeneous cultures, where individual values are shared, there will be too little variation in individual values to make cultural frog ponds a meaningful definition of culture. Researchers who use frog pond definitions of culture also need to make an informed decision regarding whether operationalizing frog ponds using the arithmetic difference or a more involved approach, such as polynomial regression, is an individual-level definition of culture and is not aggregated (e.g., Edwards, 2001).

**Unit level**

**Additive culture**

The first definition of unit-level culture we discuss is additive culture, or the aggregate of personal values. Additive conceptualizations of culture are based on the additive compositional model described by Chan (1998) and therefore are assessed by measuring individual values (e.g., *I value X*) and calculating the value average across members of a given culture. In additive models of culture the mean of personal values is taken as an adequate representation of unit-level culture, regardless of the degree
of variation in individual values within that culture. Therefore, the key assumptions for additive models of culture are that (1) the aggregate values of the individuals living in a given society are an accurate description of that culture and (2) the degree of variance, or sharedness, in individual values within a culture is not necessarily a critical definitional feature of culture.

Many additive models of culture have been advanced (Hofstede, 1980; Schwartz, 1994). Definitions of culture as additive are potentially problematic, however, when the degree of variance in individual attitudes has implications for the phenomenon of interest. Specifically, a culture in which all members reported average agreement with a given value (e.g., three on a five-point scale) would have the same additive culture score as a culture in which half of the members report low agreement (e.g., one on a five-point scale) and half of the members report high agreement (e.g., five on a five-point scale) on the same value. Therefore, additive models of culture are only appropriate when the “homogeneous” and “split” cultures described above are conceptualized as having the same theoretical meaning and/or are irrelevant for one’s theory.

Consensus culture

The second type of unit-level culture we discuss is consensus culture, which is based on the direct consensus compositional model described by Chan (1998). Consensus culture consists of aggregating individual value scores in cultures where values are shared. Like additive cultures, consensus cultures are measured by assessing individual values (e.g., I value X) and aggregating them to the unit level. Unlike additive cultures, however, the construct of consensus culture is only meaningful when values are shared among the members of a given culture, for example as evidenced by an $r_{wg}$ value greater than .70 (e.g., Cohen, Doveh, & Eick, 2001). Therefore, the key assumptions for additive models of culture are that (1) individual values are an accurate description of culture and (2) individual values must be shared to be a meaningful reflection of culture. Consensus models of culture have traditionally been rarer than additive models of culture. Although rare, the consensus model reflects many definitions of culture that stipulate that culture is a shared construct. Like all models of culture, however, consensus models also have limitations and may not be appropriate in all contexts. For example, even when aggregation statistics (e.g., ICC, $r_{wg}$) indicate agreement, individual values are unlikely to be perfectly shared within a culture, suggesting that there might still be meaningful dispersion in values that should be modeled in theory and research.

Cultural descriptive norms

The third type of unit-level culture we discuss is cultural descriptive norms. Descriptive norms, which fit the referent-shift compositional model described by Chan (1998), are defined as shared perceptions of what is valued or normative in a given society. Descriptive norm models differ from additive and consensus models by using the culture, instead of the individual, as a referent when measuring values (e.g., People in this culture value X). Specifically, descriptive norms are measured by assessing individual perceptions of what is valued in the culture in general (i.e., subjective cultural press), and then averaging perceptions across members of a single culture.

Like consensus models of culture, descriptive norm models of culture assume that perceptions of what is valued in a given society must be shared among members of that society in order for culture to be meaningful. Therefore, the key assumptions of the descriptive norms model of culture are that (1) perceptions of what is valued in a society meaningfully captures culture, and (2) perceptions of cultural values must be shared to accurately reflect culture. Like consensus models, descriptive norm models are also comparatively rare, although the GLOBE study provides a notable exception (e.g., House et al., 2004).

The descriptive norms model of culture has some advantages over additive or consensus models of culture. Most notably, agreement among members of a culture is likely to be greater when they are
asked to report on the values of their culture as compared to their individual values. Descriptive norm definitions of culture, however, also have drawbacks. Most notably, when individual members of a culture disagree in their perceptions of cultural norms, this definition of culture becomes inappropriate.

**Culture as dispersion**

The fourth and final type of unit-level culture we discuss is culture as dispersion. Consistent with Chan’s (1998) compositional model terminology, we define dispersion as differences in cultural values, attitudes, or beliefs among members of a given society. Culture as dispersion departs from the three other forms of unit level culture in that dispersion models define culture as variance instead of central tendency. At the individual level, dispersion models of culture can be grounded in either personal values (e.g., I value X) or subjective cultural press (e.g., People in this culture value X). At the unit level, dispersion models of culture are measured as the variance or standard deviation of the individual variable of interest. The central assumption in dispersion models of culture is that within-society variation in individual level values is meaningful, rather than an artifact of measurement error.

CCOP research has generally not taken a dispersion approach to culture. Evidence for the meaningfulness of dispersion models of culture, however, can be gathered by drawing an analogy between research on societal culture and research on organizational climate and culture. Schneider, Salvaggio, and Subirats (2002) introduced the concept of climate strength, defined as within group variability in perceptions of organizational climate, and found that climate strength interacted with the average climate (i.e., mean climate perceptions) to predict organizational outcomes. Similarly, we theorize that accounting for variability in values within a society, in addition to the mean level of values, will meaningfully contribute to our understanding of key outcomes of culture (cf. Au, 1999; Gelfand, Nishii, & Raver, 2006). For example, consider two societies with moderate country-level aggregated scores on individualism. In one country all members moderately endorse the value of individualism, but in the other country half of the members are highly individualistic and the other half are highly collectivistic. One might expect there to be substantially more within-society conflict in the culture with variability in individualism values than in the culture with homogenous individualism values.

Within society variance may emerge for a variety of reasons, and therefore make dispersion models a meaningful definition of culture. For example, members of a given society might vary substantially in cultural values if the society contains ethnic or religious subgroups or if certain members of the culture are geographically isolated from the rest of the culture. Similarly, substantial variation is also expected in loose societies, that is, societies that present weak norms for behavior (cf. Gelfand et al., 2006). Alternatively, in societies where there are strong threats to survival, and therefore strong needs for coordinated social action and predictability, within-society variability in culture is less likely to emerge. To the extent that a sample of interest contains some cultures with homogenous individual values and some cultures with variability in individual values, dispersion models of culture will likely capture meaningful cultural effects. To the extent that all cultures in the sample of interest are either highly homogeneous or highly variable, dispersion models of culture will be less meaningful.

Thus far we have discussed subjective definitions of culture in which the measurement of culture is based on the perceptions and values of individuals. A key assumption across all subjective models of culture is that individuals are able to provide explicit and accurate descriptions of values and/or norms. In this section we discuss several definitions of culture as objective and/or implicit, which do not require explicit reports of values and/or norms. These conceptualizations and measures of culture are rarely used in organizational psychology, yet they provide alternatives to direct ratings of cultures and measurement issues associated with such ratings.
Objective culture
One alternative to subjective cultural ratings is objective culture, which includes artifacts, cultural practices, and behavioral patterns (e.g., Kozlowski & Klein, 2000; Triandis, 1972). Because they represent the culture in its entirety, these measures are unit-level definitions of culture. Thus, a key assumption of objective measures of culture is that the element selected is representative of the culture as a whole. With this approach, culture can be measured through cultural artifacts, such as road signs, architecture, or tools. For example, Miyamoto, Nisbett, and Masuda (2006) coded street scenes from the U.S. and Japan in order to study cultural differences. Similarly, cultural practices such as religious rituals, family living arrangements, school curriculum, or behavioral patterns can also be used as global measures of culture. Levine and Norenzayan (1999) used walking speed, the speed at which postal workers complete a task, and the accuracy of public clocks to assess pace of life across cultures. Kashima and Kashima (2003) examined the degree to which languages allow pronouns to be dropped as an important correlate of individualism across nations.

The major advantage of objective measures of culture is that they are not grounded in the perceptions of individuals. Thus, factors that may bias response on surveys that measure cultural values (e.g., halo or central tendency rating biases) are not problematic. Alternatively, the major weakness of objective culture is that it is a more distal measure of culture than subjective value ratings. Furthermore, because it is the job of the researcher to extract meaning from measures of objective culture, measures of objective culture are not free from human biases and a given artifact may have more than one cultural interpretation. Due to the limitations associated with each method, ideally, one would look for convergent findings across both objective and subjective measures of culture.

Implicit culture
Implicit culture is the subconscious differences in attitudes, values, beliefs, or norms across cultural groups. Implicit culture, by definition, is assessed through non-explicit means such as the Implicit Association Test (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) or other unobtrusive methods. Unlike objective culture, implicit culture can be assessed as a property of individuals, or aggregated to the unit level. Although asking participants to explicitly state the values that either they endorse personally or that are endorsed more generally by their culture is the dominant method for assessing culture, researchers have argued that culture can also be defined as tacit knowledge, rather than explicit knowledge (cf. Kitayama & Uchida, 2005). Therefore, key assumptions that underlie implicit definitions of culture are that (1) people are not always aware of their own values and beliefs and those of their groups (or may not always provide unbiased reports) and (2) subconscious processes can be validly assessed and used as an indicator of culture. Several examples of implicit measures of culture can be found in the literature, including implicit measures of information processing (Kitayama, Duffy, Kawamura, & Larsen, 2003), self-esteem (Kitayama & Karasawa, 1997), motivation (Hofer, Chasiotis, & Campos, 2006), and attitudes (Kim, Sarason, & Sarason, 2006). Implicit measures provide non-obtrusive measures of cultural differences, yet as with subjective measures, the construct validity of such measures both across and within cultures is needed to make accurate inferences.

In summary, our typology includes definitions of culture that are both objective and subjective, implicit and explicit, and a property of both individuals and units. Given the myriad possibilities for defining culture, it is perhaps not surprising that the level at which culture is defined is inconsistent across research studies. To address the inconsistency, and therefore move toward a sophisticated understanding of where culture operates, we do not advocate one “right” definition of culture or suggest that all scholars agree upon the most appropriate level for defining the construct of culture. Rather, we urge cross-cultural organizational scholars to carefully consider different options for defining culture, use the definition that is most appropriate given the context of a research study, and
provide an explicit rationale for why culture is defined at a particular level of analysis. Such careful attention to defining culture at the appropriate level of analysis will not only increase our ability to compare similar findings across studies, but will also help to advance a truly global organizational science by building a deeper understanding of where culture operates.

Thus far, we have addressed the need to refine the types of questions we ask as well as the need to increase specificity when defining the central construct (i.e., culture) in global organizational research. We have yet to address the next step in the research process, that is, modeling the effects of culture on the types of processes and outcomes studied in the organizational sciences. To this end, in the next and last section we highlight a key limitation of the types of models commonly used in current cross-cultural research. Specifically, we argue that current research assesses the effects of culture using models that are highly decontextualized, and therefore does not provide a sophisticated understanding of when culture matters. In other words, the types of models used in cross-cultural research generally do not take into account the effects of other multilevel contexts (e.g., work teams, organizations, industries), in addition to the cultural context, and therefore have yet to systematically build knowledge regarding the boundary conditions for the effects of culture in organizational contexts.

A Global Organizational Science Understands When Culture Matters: Modeling Culture and Context

A global organizational science should build a sophisticated understanding of when culture matters by modeling the interrelationships between culture and other multilevel contexts. Like defining the level at which culture operates, deciding how to model the effects of culture is a complex process that is riddled with multi-level concerns, and we argue that CCOP will benefit from scholars being explicit about the multilevel models being tested. Drawing on Kozlowski and Klein’s (2000) terminology, researchers maybe interested in single-level models wherein they examine cultural processes at either the national, organizational, team, or individual level of analysis. For example, at the societal level, one might examine how societal-level constructs (e.g., country-level scores of individualism-collectivism, power distance, tightness-looseness) are either affected by societal-level antecedents (e.g., temperature, natural resources, population density, economic structure, history of conflict), or affect societal outcomes (e.g., crime rates, conformity, or innovation). Alternatively, researchers may model the cross-level direct effects of culture. For example, one might examine how culture at the societal level has a direct effect on lower level outcomes, including organizations, teams, and individuals. Finally, cross-cultural researchers may theorize that culture will have cross-level moderated effects. Research in this tradition might examine how societal level culture moderates relationships at the organizational and individual levels. For example, a researcher might be interested in examining how societal culture moderates the impact of diversity in organizations on organizational performance. Alternatively, a researcher might model the moderating effect of culture on the relationship between organizational practices and individual-level cognitions, motives, or emotions (see Gelfand, Leslie, & Shteynberg, 2007). Regardless of the type of multilevel model being tested, it is important for the advancement of CCOP for researchers to be explicit and use similar terminology when developing cross-cultural multilevel models.

Apart from being explicit in terms of different multilevel models, another major concern for the future of CCOP is to incorporate non-cultural contextual factors into multilevel models and research. Put simply, while prioritizing culture in theories and research, we need to be mindful that culture is not the only predictive factor for organizational phenomena. Indeed, the notion that the cultural context is so powerful as to override all other context effects is not only naive but likely inaccurate. Numerous
non-cultural contexts have previously been shown to affect organizational behavior, including community contexts (e.g., Brief, Umphress, Dietz, Burrows, Butz, & Scholten, 2005), industry contexts (Chatman & Jehn, 1994), organizational contexts (e.g., structure, organizational climate; Schneider et al., 2002; Sherman & Smith, 1984), work unit contexts (e.g., size; Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1993), and individual differences. Yet cross-cultural organizational research often ignores non-cultural factors in theories and research. Take, for example, the prediction that individuals cooperate more in collectivistic than individualistic cultures. A common design for testing this notion involves comparing the frequency of cooperation in a collectivistic culture (e.g., Japan) with an individualistic culture (e.g., the U.S.), or assessing the correlation between individualism-collectivism and cooperation in one or more cultures. In these research designs, other features of the context relevant to cooperation (e.g., quality of leadership, organizational structure and rewards, individual differences) are ignored, and therefore implicitly assumed to be irrelevant.

**Suggestions for contextualizing models of culture**

A global organizational psychology thus requires a complex understanding of the contextual contingencies of culture. It requires, in other words, a thorough understanding of how cultural and non-cultural contexts are interrelated and collectively affect behavior in organizations. We suggest that future CCOP research explicitly incorporate contextual factors directly into research designs and specify the model that is being examined. As discussed below, culture and contextual factors may simultaneously and independently influence a phenomenon of interest (i.e., mixed determinant models), and they may interact in complex ways to influence a phenomenon of interest (cultural amplifiers, suppressors, reducers).

**Modeling culture and context: mixed-determinant models**

Mixed determinant models (Kozlowski & Klein, 2000) are models in which an outcome (e.g., individual behavior; team performance) is theorized to have antecedents at multiple levels of analysis (e.g., societal culture, industry culture, organizational culture, work unit culture). Incorporating mixed determinants into CCOP research means developing and testing theories in which the outcome of interest is affected by different levels of context, one of which is national culture (see Figure 1). Although rare, some CCOP research has used the mixed determinant approach to understand the effects of national culture. The GLOBE project found that collectivism at both the societal and organizational levels of analysis independently affected the types of leader behaviors that were viewed as effective (Gelfand, Bhawuk, Nishii, & Bechtold, 2004). Likewise, both societal culture and the industry context was found to affect organizational culture (Brodbeck, Hanges, Dickson, Gupta, & Dorfman, 2004). Thus, assessing the impact of societal culture combined with other contextual elements (e.g., industry, organizational culture) provides a more complete account of the factors that affect an organizational behavior phenomenon of interest, and the amount of variance explained by national culture as compared to other factors.

**Modeling culture and context: interaction models**

In addition to simultaneously affecting outcomes as in mixed determinant models, cultural and contextual factors may interact in complex ways. We discuss three ways in which contextual factors
can moderate cultural effects, and in particular how contextual factors may amplify, suppress, or reverse cultural effects on organizational phenomena.

**Culture amplifiers**

Contextual factors might serve as *culture amplifiers*, or in other words, might strengthen or exacerbate cultural differences. Cross-cultural differences may be amplified in a number of ways. First, elements of the context may activate the salience of cultural norms and values and therefore allow the expression of culture (*cf.*, Tett & Burnett, 2003). For example, research has found that accountability to constituents enhances the propensity for collectivists to be cooperative and for individualists to be competitive in negotiation (Gelfand & Realo, 1999). Accountability in this respect serves as a norm enforcement mechanism in any particular culture and exacerbates cultural differences as compared to unaccountable conditions. At a higher level of analysis, either industry or work group factors may also amplify cultural effects by increasing the salience of culture. For example at the industry level, customer service-oriented industries, as compared to manufacturing or other industries, are likely amplifiers of the effects of culture in organizations. In service industries, employees have frequent interactions with customers. Through these interactions the prevailing values of the culture are reinforced and made cognitively accessible. Second, the demographic composition of the work group may serve as a cultural amplifier. For example, Wagner (1995) found that tendencies toward cooperation among collectivists were stronger in homogenous groups than in groups that contained a mix of ingroup and outgroup members. One explanation for this finding is that being surrounded by a similar others, as opposed to dissimilar others, activated cultural norms and therefore strengthened the effect of culture on behavior. Alternatively, contextual factors might increase the tendency of individuals to engage in automatic processing and therefore rely on well-learned cultural tendencies. For example, contexts that produce high cognitive load, high time pressure, or high threat will increase the tendency for individuals to act consistently with the well-learned cultural tendencies. Chiu et al. (2000) found that the tendency for individualists to make internal attributions and collectivists to make external attributions was more extreme among individuals with a high need for cognitive closure, which is defined as a desire to reduce ambiguity in the social context (e.g., Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). Although need for closure is generally studied as an individual difference variable, we similarly propose that high need for closure contexts, such as contexts where there is a high degree of threat or time pressure, will increase automatic processing, which in turn will amplify the effect of well-learned cultural tendencies.

**Culture suppressors**

By contrast, culture suppressors are context factors that override general cultural differences and therefore weaken the culture-outcome relationship. We theorize that suppressing contexts will affect
outcomes of culture by deactivating the salience of societal cultural norms and values and therefore disallowing the expression of culture (cf., Tett & Burnett, 2003). In other words, culture suppressors are situations that provide strong cues for behavior and therefore negate the effect of societal culture on the outcome of interest. In general, strong situations, which invoke invariant expectations for behavior (Mischel, 1977) will tend to override cultural differences. The organizational context, including both organizational culture and the structure of organizational rewards, can provide a situation strong enough to override cultural effects. For example, societal culture is unlikely to have a strong effect on outcomes in a multinational organization with a strong organizational culture. Similarly, organizational structure and rewards may suppress the effects of culture. For example, to the extent that organizations have strong cooperative reward structures, such as profit-sharing or group-based performance appraisals, there may be less of a difference between individualists and collectivists in their motivation to pursue group goals instead of individual goals (cf. Ramamoorthy & Flood, 2002). At the individual level, having a global mindset or global identity might reduce cultural differences within multicultural team contexts (Shokef & Erez, 2006). More generally, factors that orient and reward individuals for similar behavior, derived from any level of analysis, might serve to suppress cross-cultural variation.

Culture reversers

The final type of context effects we specify are cultural reversers, or situations that reverse the typical direction of the culture-outcome relationship and therefore radically alter cultural differences. We theorize that reversing contexts affect outcomes of culture by releasing actors from the constraints of culture. In other words, culture reversers are low accountability situations that free individuals from pressures to abide by cultural norms. As an example of how contexts may reverse the effects of culture, consider the relationship between individualism-collectivism and competition-cooperation. As discussed above, research has found that collectivists are more likely to cooperate than individualists (Triandis, 1994). Research has supported this general maxim in monitored contexts; however, in unmonitored contexts, in which actors are not accountable for their decisions, and therefore freed from cultural constraints, the effect is reversed such that individualists cooperate while collectivists compete (e.g., Gelfand & Realo, 1999; Yamagishi, 1988). Although likely rarer than situations that amplify or suppress culture, certain organizational contexts may facilitate the reversal of cultural effects. For example, reversals may occur in organizations that have low formalization and low centralization and where decision making is unmonitored.1

In summary, CCOP needs to build multilevel models which incorporate cultural as well as non-cultural sources of variance in order to move beyond the more simplistic modeling of cultural main effects which pervades the field. Even when it is not possible to include other contexts when modeling the effects of culture, researchers can still contribute to the goal of contextualizing cross-cultural organizational research by reporting greater detail regarding the context of the samples studied (e.g., job type, work group characteristics, industry, organizational structure, geographic region, religious affiliation, language, ethnicity, gender, age, SES), and explicitly describing how the sample studied may differ from the population to which the researchers hope to generalize (cf. Johns, 2006; Rousseau & Fried, 2001). Consistent reporting on the context of the sample studied will prevent others from generalizing results found in one sample to different organizational contexts or an entire nation when

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1We note that cultural reversers qualitatively differ from culture suppressors. Culture suppressors provide strong situations that negate the effects of culture. Thus, in a suppressing situation that provides strong cues for cooperation (e.g., interdependent rewards) individuals with both individualistic and collectivistic orientations are expected to cooperate, regardless of culture. Alternatively, culture reversers are situations in which individuals are freed from cultural norms, thus prompting individualists to cooperate and collectivists to compete. Unlike cultural suppression, in cases of cultural reversals culture still predicts behavior. The effect of culture, however, is in the opposite of the predicted direction.
such conclusions may be unwarranted. Moreover, when context is consistently reported, meta-analysis can be used to determine if certain features of the context moderate observed cross-cultural relationships.

Concluding Remarks

The organizational sciences are making marked steps toward being more global in their reach. We have come a long way since Bass and Barrett’s (1976) call for the internationalization of organizational psychology over 30 years ago. As Kirkman and Law (2005) and others have noted, organizational science’s valuation of and enthusiasm for cross-cultural research continues and shows no sign of abating. However, along with this enthusiasm comes a need to build a science that is sensitive to the needs of other cultures and is truly global in its reach. The Non-Western world, after all, is not simply a venue through which to test the strength of Western theories, but is critical to expand the very questions and paradigms that define the field. In this paper, we have highlighted three fundamental ways in which organizational science can reach its global potential. We have argued that we must work to move beyond the “theory export” paradigm and broaden the types of questions we ask, particularly by examining how the assumptions of independence, postmaterialism, and protestant relational ideology underlie the questions we ask. We have also argued that attention to levels of analysis in conceptualizations and measurements of culture needs to be more multifaceted and explicit. Finally, we have argued that increased attention is needed to the heterogeneity of cultures, and that a deeper appreciation and consideration of the role of context in shaping cultural phenomena is needed. With increased attention to these ideals, we will no doubt be in a better position to approximate a truly global organizational science.

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