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Culture: A brief history of meaning in psychology

Culture is one of the most used and perhaps abused concepts in contemporary academic and popular discourse. Despite its current popularity, it has seen its vicissitudes in the history of psychology. Culture was an integral part of the nascent academic discipline of psychology over a century ago, but was lost once and found again, and has been reclaimed with enthusiasm. It is this chequered history that we attempt to describe and to explain. What historical circumstances—both indigenous to the intellectual discourse (e.g., scholarly traditions generally and psychology in particular) and exogenous to it (e.g., political economy of the time)—raised or lowered the profile of culture in psychology? Are there potentially general causal processes involved, or are they primarily happenstances of history? Our overall assessment is that both indigenous and exogenous causal processes are at work; however, there seems to be a large number of happenstances. In what follows, we trace the evolution of research on culture in psychology. We begin with some examples of early historical interest in culture and psychology in Greece and China, and thereafter examine culture as it was viewed in the 18th century in the Enlightenment and Counter-Enlightenment or Romanticism. We highlight important cultural works in anthropology in the 19th century, and then discuss the vicissitudes of culture in psychology in the 20th century, ending with current debates and trends in culture and social psychology in particular. Towards the end of the chapter, we also engage in some crystal ball gazing—always a hazardous endeavor when it comes to complex human affairs—about the future of the culture concept in psychology.

A note on the definition of culture

A British anthropologist, Edward Burnett Tylor (1871/1996) is often credited with first defining culture in anthropology. Equating culture and civilization, he gave the following definition: “Culture or Civilization, taken in its wide ethnographic sense, is that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man [sic] as a member of society” (p. 1). Once believed to be a conceptual trademark of anthropologists, the concept of culture has now become indispensable for other social scientists including psychologists, sociologists, cultural studies scholars, and even evolutionary biologists.

We define culture somewhat differently than Tylor to facilitate our exposition of culture in the history of psychology. By culture, we mean a set of meanings or information that is nongenetically transmitted from one individual to another, which is more or less shared within a population (or a group) and endures for some generations. This definition clearly differentiates culture from society, which we take to be a collection of individuals and groups, their relationships, and their institutions. Culture is the information or meaning that is contained, represented, or otherwise embodied in those objects and structures. Cultural information is nonetheless distinguished from genetic information in that they differ in mechanism of transmission; cultural information is socially transmitted, whereas genetic information is genetically transmitted. The definition of culture is agnostic as to the extent to which culture is presumed to be well structured or systemic—Tylor defines it holistically, but the current definition makes no assumption about its systemicity. It may be well structured or integrated, or it may be unorganized or fragmented. Nonetheless, culture is obviously distinguished from a fashion or fad as it endures over some generations.

With this broad and generic definition in mind, let us begin a journey forward from both—Western and Eastern—ends of Eurasia.

A very brief background

Human curiosity about culture has a long history. There are well-known examples of writings about foreign customs and beliefs—what we may broadly call culture in Tylor’s vein—such as Herodotus’s History in Greek antiquity and Chunqiu in early China. Numerous writings about human cultural diversity, varying in quality and sophistication, have existed throughout human history. One may be forgiven to conjecture that perceived differences in customs and mores—any encounters with “foreign” peoples, that is—are triggers of the curiosity about culture and human diversity. When this curiosity is coupled with the utility of cultural information about “others” for trade or other worldly endeavors, it is not surprising that there is a great deal of interest in foreign cultures and human diversity. To put it simply, the growing interest in culture seems to occur
when increasing intercultural encounters, and subsequent recognition of cultural differences, are combined with the circumstances in which tangible gains or a reduction of tangible losses can result from exchanges of goods, services, and other resources with people from “foreign” backgrounds (e.g., trade, colonization, territorial expansion).

Indeed, using the Western European historical experience as an example, it was in the Renaissance era of the 15th–16th centuries that Italian city states and some parts of Western Europe began the intellectual journey away from the religiously induced closing of European minds during the Middle Ages, arguably due to the expanding mercantile and intellectual exchanges between these areas with Islamic societies and beyond. A well known example is Marco Polo's travels through the Middle East and Far East. Although his travels are believed to have taken place earlier, in the 13th century, his book (and its multiple variants before printing) was widely circulated in Europe. Eventually, information about foreign beliefs and customs began to flow into Europe during the era of great voyages and European discoveries of the new worlds (16th–17th centuries). Characteristically, Columbus’ letter about his first voyage to his patrons is regarded as “the first important ethnographic document of modern times” (Liebersohn 2008, p. 20) in which he reported his observations of the unfamiliar customs of Native Americans with astonishment. European interests in human diversity went hand in hand with the expanding trade of goods, conquests of the “natives” and their lands, and missionary penetrations of the rest of the world. The colonization and enslavement of the indigenous peoples, and oppressive practices therein, was often met by the missionaries’ moral outrage (Liebersohn, 2008). Although these reports were somewhat naïve and less than reliable, this new knowledge about foreign peoples and their cultures had to be reconciled with the Christian and Aristotelian world view.

Although there are different variants of this line of thinking—Condorcet’s “primitive” savages or Rousseau’s “noble” savages—Enlightenment thinkers implicitly or explicitly contend that all human societies can be located on a linear ladder of progress and human evolution with varying degrees of enlightenment. Reports about foreign cultures from European travelers, conquerors, and colonizers were used to place those contemporary societies along this universal scale. Typically, mainly non-European societies and peoples were seen to be at primitive stages of evolution, whereas European societies and peoples at more civilized stages. The belief in universal and linear evolution, whether in religion (Tylor, 1871), industry (Morgan, 1877), modes of thought (Comte, 1830–1842) or mentality (Levy-Bruhl, 1923) fundamentally put the “others” at an inferior stage of development (Klineberg, 1980). Rationality, and natural science seen as its epitome, was to enlighten humans away from their primitive traditions, which were viewed as marred by superstitions, irrational prejudices, and traditional rules of the ancien régime.

Enlightenment thoughts had both epistemic and political dimensions. Epistemically, it represented an empiricist push for knowledge on the basis of systematic observation of the universe; politically, it was a liberal movement to emancipate people from the feudal power. What underlies both of these dimensions is the doctrine that all humans are endowed with the capacity to reason. This capacity then enables humans to make use of their observations, make rational inferences from those observations, and reach rational conclusions about universal natural laws. Because the capacity to reason is the universal core that makes humans what they are, it makes all humans equal in principle. Ideas of the basic equality of humankind and the inalienable human rights indeed echo throughout history—in the Declaration of Independence of the 13 states, the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and to the present day. In this Enlightenment view, humans were thought to be part of the Newtonian universe, which follows the laws of nature that Newton discovered. “God said let Newton be, and all was light!”—the praise heaped on Newton attributed to Alexander Pope—exemplifies the Enlightenment’s unbounded optimism for human destiny and natural science’s role in human progress.

In contrast, the Counter-Enlightenment or Romantic thinkers pitted culture against universal civilization, claiming the uniqueness and particularity of a people, their history, and their tradition. Vico’s (1725/1948) The New Science is often credited as the main source of inspiration for this school of thought. Although he too had an evolutionary view of the human history, Vico did not view progress as following a linear form, but rather as a cyclical pattern of progression and regression among the divine, the heroic, and the human phases. His analysis focused on symbolic representations of various forms—from the poetic, the narrative, to the argumentative (Berlin, 1980). In this view, culture represents a deep, unchangeable essence of a group of people. A people—often equated with a nation—construct their culture, using their unique language and following their unique

**Enlightenment and Counter-Enlightenment—Setting the scene**

So it was in the 18th century in Western Europe that contemporary academic and popular discourse about culture found its roots. As a product of this tradition, modern psychology as an academic discipline was no exception. What is loosely known as the Enlightenment, an intellectual movement away from Christian religious beliefs and customs in favor of scientific knowledge, and a counterpoint to this movement, sometimes called the Counter-Enlightenment or Romanticism, both set the intellectual scene for many of the subsequent discussions about culture.

*Enlightenment* thinkers (e.g., Voltaire) emphasized *civilization* and human progress driven by the natural and universal human capacity to reason. Human history was seen to be a natural and universal progression from the primitive “savages” to the civilized state; it is the environment in which humans find themselves that clouds the shining light of reason, leaving some peoples and their customs in the darkness of superstition.
customs. Because they constitute their culture, and culture constitutes their mentality, it is only through a deep understanding of their culture that one can fathom their thoughts and their way of life. The German idealist tradition (e.g., Herder, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel) extended and championed this line of thinking. It was Moritz Lazarus and Hajim Steinthal, following Wilhelm von Humboldt's lead, that institutionalized the notion of Völkerpsychologie (roughly translatable as "cultural psychology") by their founding of Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und Sprachwissenschaft (Journal for Cultural Psychology and Philology) in 1860 (Jahoda, 1992).

Counter-Enlightenment thoughts also had both epistemic and political implications. Epistemically, the Counter-Enlightenment was more aligned with an achievement of Verstehen (understanding), rather than the "discovery" of natural laws; politically, it was often associated with a sort of nationalism—a celebration of the particular and the uniqueness of a nation. Underlying both the epistemic and political dimensions of the Counter-Enlightenment is a view of humans as collectively constituting their society and culture through their shared mentality. Put simply, a people (Volk) have a common mentality, which enables them to have a deep empathic understanding and appreciation of each other’s actions and meanings. Those who do not share the same mentality can nonetheless gain insights by finding out the meaning of cultural representations through judicious examination of another’s language, symbolisms, and activities of meaning-making more generally. In this view, the shared mentality—or shared culture—is the essence of the people; those who have it belong to their nation and this essentialized collective. Note the close connection between the mental and the cultural. In this tradition, various theorists called this approach a Geisteswissenschaften or Kulturwissenschaften, going back and forth between the mental (Geist) and the cultural (Kultur; Jahoda, 1992). Such views can encourage one to draw a sharp boundary between one’s nation and other nations—an ideology that can be used to justify a nationalist sentiment. Nonetheless, it is important to recognize that there is no logically necessary connection between Counter-Enlightenment and nationalism. There are many notable exceptions that emphasized strong humanistic orientations as well (e.g., Adolf Bastian).

By the 19th century, European nations colonized much of the rest of the world. Within each of the European colonial powers, the need for governance, conduct and regulation of trade, and movement of goods, resources, and people—including slavery—emerged; knowledge about foreign cultures, especially of colonized peoples and others with whom they traded, would have been in demand. In France, the Société ethnologique de Paris was established in 1839, followed by the Ethnological Society of London (1843) in Britain. The academic discipline of anthropology or ethnology as a systematic investigation of culture became institutionalized with the professorial appointment of its founding fathers such as Edward B. Tylor (1896 at Oxford) in Britain and Emile Durkheim's nephew, Marcel Mauss (1902 at École Pratique des Hautes Études) in France. Although colonial policies and anthropology were not so clearly interdependent—there is little evidence for example of anthropologists obtaining grants to study the “natives” for the purpose of colonial rule (Eriksen & Nielsen, 2001)—it seems safe to argue that the history of European colonization of the world provided a strong backdrop for the demand of anthropological knowledge.

In North America, Franz Boas’s appointment as professor of anthropology at Columbia University in 1899 set the stage for the establishment of academic anthropology, although North American curiosity about the American Indians and their cultures went much farther back (Darnell, 2008). In a way, the modern North American nation from its very inception encountered vastly different cultures on a regular basis. At every step of its nationhood, there was a strong demand for knowledge about cultural differences—it is thus not at all surprising that the research of American Indian cultures became an enduring characteristic of North American anthropology. Boas, trained in Germany, was “a true child of German romantic humanism” (Eriksen & Nielsen, 2001, p. 39). In his division of anthropology into four broad fields—linguistics, physical anthropology, archaeology, and cultural anthropology—he highlighted the importance of language and meaning carried by it, echoing the Counter-Enlightenment thinking. His insistence on cultural relativism—to understand cultural ideas and practices from the native’s point of view in their particularistic cultural milieu—and his antiracist attitudes were legendary. Two generations of cultural anthropologists trained or mentored by him—Alfred Kroeber, Robert Lowie, Edward Sapir, Melville Herskovits, Ruth Benedict, and Margaret Mead—formed a strong center of gravity for the North American tradition of anthropology.

Culture in psychology

In psychology, too, the two sources of intellectual traditions, Enlightenment and Romanticism, or the contrasting natural versus cultural models of scientific inquiry, are discernible. Wilhelm Wundt, a founder of academic psychology, established the first experimental psychological laboratory in Leipzig, Germany, in 1879, using introspection as a main method of inquiry. Despite his celebrated experimental psychology, much of his scholarly attention was devoted to Völkerpsychologie later in his life. Examining the meaning of cultural artifacts and language, he aspired to understand higher-order mental processes, while leaving the basic processes to experimental psychological inquiries. Underlying this division of labor was the assumption of a clear severance of the cultural and the biological in the human mind—culture and language affect higher-order psychological processes that deal with meaning, whereas more basic physiological processes are affected by biology and unaffected by culture. This assumption still lingers in contemporary psychology at the beginning of the 21st century, though as we discuss later, it is being challenged by new fields, most notably cultural neuroscience. Wundt’s experimental psychology and Völkerpsychologie were
themselves reflections of his time and place, echoing his
crush companion, Wilhelm Dilthey's 'Naturwissenschaften and
Geisteswissenschaften' (often translated as natural science and
cultural science), which represented the Enlightenment and the
Counter-Enlightenment conceptions of the person (Kashima,
2000a).

In fact, natural science and cultural science models of inquiry
have been contemplated throughout the history of psychology
and other social sciences. Through logical positivism and its
close ally Karl Popper's reconstruction of science, the natural
science model is now seen to represent a constellation of
epistemic practices that emphasize universal laws, causal
explanation, and experimentation. Regarding physics as the
ideals of scientific inquiry, the natural science model's primary
goal is to establish a universal law-like causal explanation
of a phenomenon. Using logico-mathematical expressions,
universal natural laws are to be axiomatized, theory-based
hypothetico-deductive inferences are made, and experiments
are conducted to verify or falsify theories. In contrast, the

cultural science model emphasizes cultural and historical specif-
city, interpretive understanding, and hermeneutics—a method
discipline to gain a true meaning of a text—rather than
experimentation as a method of knowing. In the cultural science
model, human experience and action should be interpreted and
understood within their sociocultural and historical context.
Instead of explaining causal structure by universal theories,
understanding is sought by recursively applying a hermeneutic
method and achieving a holistic appreciation of the meaning of
the human experience and action within their local milieu.

In retrospect, it is noteworthy that the interwar era of the
1920s and 1930s saw the appearance of several figures critical
for the culture and psychology literature today: Lev Vygotsky
in Russia (then part of the Soviet Union), Frederick Bartlett in
the United Kingdom, and Lucien Lévy-Bruhl in France.
Although George Herbert Mead in the United States is not
regarded as a theorist on culture, but mostly on society, his
theorizing too has much to offer to psychology that regards
culture as meaning-making activities.

Vygotsky's contributions are varied and difficult to charac-
terize briefly. Interested readers are encouraged to consult
English translations of his work (Vygotsky, 1978) and others'
explications of his contributions (Wertsch, 1985). One class of
his ideas that has influenced contemporary psychology strongly
is his theory about the process of enculturation—how cultural
ideas and practices that are located outside a person become
internalized into the person's mind and body through his or her
participation in meaningful (i.e., authentic) cultural activities
using psychological tools. Tools can include not only material
tools (e.g., hammers and chisels) but also symbolic ones (such
as language). As well, Vygotsky argued that because thought is
made possible through internalized language, and language
comes from society, the mind is fundamentally a product of
society. It is well known that his theorizing was strongly influ-
enced by Karl Marx's theory of social action, and Vygotsky's
theory may be considered to be a psychological extension of

this intellectual tradition (without necessarily being "Marxist"
in the politico-economic sense). His perspective is strongly
temporal in that human activities in cultural context are located
within the temporal dimension with different time scales—
phylogenetic, historical, and ontogenetic—and seen to generate
these processes as well as the products of them. Prior to his
premature death at the age of 37, his research concentrated on
the ontology of enculturation. In particular, contemporary
psychology has taken on board Vygotsky's notion of zone of
proximal development. This suggests that there is a certain zone
of activities that a child can acquire with the assistance of
another, and the child may not be able to learn the requisite
skills if they lie outside this zone. Human learning, he argued
"presupposes a specific social nature and a process by which
children grow into the intellectual life of those around them"
(Vygotsky, 1978, p. 88). Although usually discussed within the
context of child development and education, it can equally
apply to adult learning. To date, there is a large following of the
Vygotskian tradition in education and developmentally oriented
research in culture and psychology, although his influence is
less pronounced in other areas.

Lévy-Bruhl was a Francophone anthropologist, who exam-
ined cultural variation in human cognition. His best known, and
perhaps most controversial, works, How Natives Think (1985),
originally published in 1910 and Primitive Mentality (1923),
were attempts at outlining the mentality of "primitive people",
that is, people not of Western European origin. Working within
a Durkheimian framework, he argued that people from the rest
of the world have collective representations (or shared cultures)
that are governed by a rule, which is markedly different from
those in Western Europe. The Western collective representa-
tions are largely governed by the law of contradiction; by
dictating that a thing cannot be both A and not A at the same
time, this logical requirement makes it imperative for concepts
to be defined mutually exclusive. In contrast, collective
representations used by the rest of the world are governed by
the law of participation, dictating that A and not A can partici-
pate with each other and a thing can be both A and not A at the
same time. A number of anthropologists criticized Lévy-Bruhl’s
characterization as heretical because they regarded this
argument as the denial of the doctrine of the “psychic unity
of mankind,” which accords all human beings a common
rationality. Nonetheless, viewed in a more contemporary frame-
work, his theoretical work amounts to an attempt at bringing to
light a rule by which cultural representations are conceptually
related to each other, thereby postulating a general rule for
making cultures intelligible. In a way, his work can be regarded
as a precursor to more recent cognitive, structural, and symbolic
anthropology (Littleton, 1985). Indeed, something akin to
Lévy-Bruhl’s law of participation is discernible in the contem-
porary theorizing of naive dialectics in social psychology
(Peng & Nisbett, 1999).

Bartlett is best known in psychology for his contribution to
research on memory (Bartlett, 1932) owing to his classic,
Remembering. He is often credited as the first psychologist to
introduce the notion of schema to psychology in his conceptualization of reconstructive memory. However, less well known is his earlier 1923 contribution to culture and psychology, *Psychology and Primitive Culture*. Inspired by his mentor, William H. R. Rivers, he developed a conceptual framework that considers how cultural artifacts and practices may diffuse from one group to another through individual and group contacts. This diffusionist idea was operationalized in his well-known experiment of serial reproduction, in which he gave an Amerindian story of the War of the Ghosts to Cambridge undergraduates and got them to reproduce it by telling it to others, who in turn retold the story to others, and so on in communication chains. The mystical story involves a young warrior who joins ghosts on canoes, gets shot by an arrow in a battle without a wound or pain, returns home, tells stories, but ultimately dies in the next morning and “something black” comes out of his mouth. As the story was told and retold, the story was transformed—canoes turned into boats, “something black” became a spirit, and the like. Basically, unfamiliar cultural elements in the story were transformed into elements that were familiar to the Britons in the post-First World War era. Bartlett called this process *conventionalization*. Put differently, this can be thought of as an experimental simulation of diffusion from one culture to another. Thus, Bartlett made two fundamental contributions. Theoretically, he conceptualized the link between culture and psychology in terms of shared schemata; methodologically, he bequeathed the serial reproduction paradigm. Although Bartlett is primarily known as a cognitive psychologist of significance, his cultural psychology is now beginning to be appreciated (Kashima, 2000b).

The natural science model dominated academic psychology, and the Enlightenment movement’s view of science, technology, and progress dominated the human political and economic affairs in the past century or so. Despite Wundt’s attempt to integrate the natural and cultural view of science at the start of psychology as an academic discipline, the fact that Boring (1950) expounded only one sentence on Wundt’s *Völkerpsychologie* in his 777-page tome, *A History of Experimental Psychology* (Cole, 1996, made this observation) is symptomatic of academic psychology’s general dismissal of the treatment of culture and the cultural science model of psychological inquiry (also witness the title of his book!). Logical positivism in philosophy of science, and its psychological counterpart, behaviorism, pushed the natural science model to the mainstream of psychology by the mid-20th century. With its exclusive focus on observable behavior, behaviorist psychology removed the mind from its scope of inquiry. Even the Cognitive Revolution of the 1960s, which brought the mind back into psychology, failed to bring meaning and culture with it. Psychology as a science was to be a hypothetico-deductive and experimental endeavor in search of universal laws of human behavior. With this, culture and emphasis on understanding human particularities were largely lost from academic discourse in psychology.

Indeed, mainstream psychology paralleled the period of human history that seemed consistent, at least from the Western European perspective, with the Enlightenment discourse of progress. Following the Industrial Revolution and industrialization of Western Europe, the world has witnessed the Western European colonization of much of Africa, Asia, and the Americas. The power of scientific knowledge and its practical counterpart in engineering and technology was obvious in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. After the turmoil of the two world wars in the first half of the 20th century, during which the universalist discourse and the nationalist discourse collided, the expansion of the capitalist market economy and its communist opposition gave rise to the Cold War. The circulation of the Enlightenment discourse of universal civilization of either the liberal democratic kind or the Marxist socialist kind went hand in hand with the visible signs of industrialization, modernization, and material prosperity.

Nonetheless, in the 1970s and 1980s, the dominance of the natural science model began to crumble. Some practitioners and philosophers of social science (e.g., Geertz, Ricœur, Taylor) began to deconstruct the natural science model of human inquiry, and to revitalize the cultural science model particularly in sociology and anthropology. In psychology too, Kenneth Gergen and others launched a social constructionist movement, which challenged the predominant natural science model of psychology. More symbolically, Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman’s theoretical and empirical assault on the myth of human rationality began to gather pace. Despite the Enlightenment credo of universal human rationality, their psychological research suggested that human reasoning does not follow the cannon of rationality after all! The irony was paramount. They made use of the hallmark of the natural scientific model—axiomatic and mathematical approaches to theory building and experimentation as a method of observation—and managed to undermine the Enlightenment ideology, the intellectual basis of the natural scientific model. The later award of a Nobel prize to Kahneman (after Tversky’s death) in 2002 legitimized the deep suspicion about human rationality in psychology. An academic stage was set to launch a research program on culture and psychology.

Interestingly, this is the historical period that saw the formation and establishment of a very visible global market economy. The trans-Atlantic alliance between a US president, Ronald Reagan (1981–1989), and a UK prime minister, Margaret Thatcher (1979–1990), promoted free trade across the globe. Economically developing nations around the world, which were gaining political independence from colonial powers, began to participate in the world economy. The collapse of the Soviet Union, symbolized by the fall of the Berlin Wall (1989), ended the Cold War, which structured much of the world’s affairs after the Second World War. Some posited the end of history (Fukuyama, 1992), understood as a dialectical progress towards the final resolution of contradictions with the apparent triumph of liberal democracy. In the late 20th century, globalization—roughly understood as an increase in economic, political, social and informational relationships among people across national boundaries—became an obvious reality. With
greater human contact and exchange came a greater exposure to behaviors and artifacts of people whose existence previously mattered only remotely to most. Human curiosity about cultures was bound to be piqued.

Contemporary developments in culture and psychology

Culture and psychology: The 1950s–1970s

Notwithstanding seminal contributions from such people as Wundt and Barlett, it was not until the 1960s that a serious community of culture scholars began to take form within psychology. Against the backdrop of mainstream psychology’s preoccupation with universal laws of human behavior, a critical mass of scholars began to demonstrate wide variability in psychological processes across cultural groups. This period witnessed many seminal studies on culture and personality (Whiting & Child, 1953; Whiting & Whiting, 1975), perception (Segall, Campbell, & Herskovits, 1966), motivation (McClelland, 1961), cognition (Witkin & Berry, 1975), and mental abilities (Cronbach & Drenth, 1972), among others, that later became the bedrock of much of modern-day cross-cultural psychology.

Work on culture and personality at the time was too voluminous to cover in this review and thus we will highlight important schools of thought and their evolution into what is now known as the field of psychological anthropology (see Bock, 1980, 1988; Hsu, 1961, 1972; Jahoda, 1980; and Kaplan, 1961 for useful summaries). Early work within the “culture and personality school” was highly influenced by Freud’s theory of psychoanalysis, which was used in varying ways to understand how culture and personality are interrelated. Within this general area, Jahoda (1980) differentiated two distinct approaches, with one school focusing on how socialization processes and personality factors vary within a particular society (see Benedict, 1934; Mead, 1928; Kardiner, 1939; Kardiner, Linton, DuBois, & West, 1945), and another school focusing on the way in which culture shapes, and is shaped by, personality across different societies (see Whiting & Child, 1953, Whiting & Whiting, 1975).

Within the former, the notion that culture is the “personality of a society,” reflecting complex configurations or patterns, can be seen in Benedict’s (1934) classic, Patterns of Culture. As with other work at the time, she often drew on clinical and psychoanalytic terminology (e.g., “Apollonian” to refer to avoiding extremes versus “Dionysian” to refer to seeking excess) as she described different cultural groups such as the Pueblo Indians and Plains Indians, respectively (Berry, Poortinga, Segall, & Dasen, 1992). For Benedict, culture was “individual psychology thrown large upon the screen, given gigantic proportions and a long time span” (Benedict, 1934, p. 24; as cited in Berry et al., 1992). Kardiner (a psychiatrist) and Linton (an anthropologist) also examined the connection between culture and personality within societies, yet they posited a distinct causal link between culture and personality (Berry et al., 1992). In their work on “basic and modal personality” (Kardiner, Linton, DuBois, & West, 1945), they argued that primary institutions (i.e., subsistence techniques and child-rearing practices) influence the basic personality structure (i.e., elements common to all or most of the culture), which in turn leads to secondary institutions (i.e., projective systems derived from the basic personality and which include art, mythology, and religion). In Kardiner and colleagues’ theorizing, personality was thought to mediate the relationship between primary and secondary institutions (Jahoda, 1980).

Their theory and methodological approach, however, was later criticized as being unduly uniform in its assumptions about personality within cultures (Bock, 1980) and as largely circular in its reasoning (Jahoda, 1980; Lindzey, 1961; Wallace, 1961).

Later work by Whiting and his colleagues largely abandoned the quest to delineate the collective personality of members of a particular society, and instead, began to examine linkages between cultural characteristics (e.g., child training practices) and personality (e.g., aggression) across societies (Whiting & Child, 1953; Whiting & Whiting, 1975). An important departure from Kardiner was the focus on personality processes, and some of its constituent parts, rather than viewing personality as a coherent whole (Jahoda, 1980). Nevertheless, their work drew heavily on Kardiner’s work in its heavy emphasis on psychoanalytic concepts. Whiting and colleagues further differentiated primary institutions into physical environment (e.g., climate, terrain), history (e.g., migrations), and maintenance systems (e.g., subsistence patterns, social structure), which were theorized to affect children’s learning environments. This, in turn, was thought to affect the development of adult personality (including learned and innate components) and projective expressive systems (similar to Kardiner’s notion of secondary institutions). Early research on this model relied on tests of data derived from Murdock’s Human Relations Area Files. However, their later seminal work Children of Six Cultures (Whiting & Whiting, 1975) used a wide variety of methods that made more direct assessments of key variables in the model. Like their predecessors, Whiting’s work was also criticized as being largely deterministic (Frijda & Jahoda, 1966), having a heavy psychoanalytic emphasis (Jahoda, 1980), and assuming that adult personality is solely determined by childhood experiences (see later work by LeVine, 1973, particularly his Darwinian variation-selection model of culture and personality, which tried to address some of these issues) (Jahoda, 1980). Nevertheless, Whiting’s work is a classic and had a major influence in cross-cultural psychology in part due to the metatheoretical and methodological similarities between the “culture as an independent variable” approach that is common in both psychological anthropology and cross-cultural psychology (Berry et al., 1992).

Another key contribution of work on culture and psychology during the 1950s and 1960s was the demonstration that even basic differences in psychological processes—such as visual perception—are not necessarily universal. At the time, the
notion that humans might vary in fundamental ways of perceiving the physical world—space, size, distance, or color—went largely unquestioned in psychology. The idea that the world is “what it appears” as far back as Plato’s parable of the cave (c. 390 BCE). Centuries later, Segall et al. (1966) were among the first to systematically document that there is wide cultural variability in susceptibility to visual illusions. Taking a largely empiricist and Brunswikian perspective, Segall et al. (1966) argued that people use whatever cues they have learned from past experience to perceive objects, a process they referred to as ecological cue validity. They further argued that visual illusions occur when previously learned cues (that have been valid in certain ecological conditions) are misapplied because of unusual or misleading characteristics of stimuli.

Their research, done across 15 countries, indeed showed that Europeans were much more susceptible to classic illusions, such as the Müller-Lyer illusion and the Sander parallelogram illusion. In explaining such differences, Segall and colleagues advanced the carpentered world hypothesis which posited that in essence, individuals who experience a lot of rectangular angles in their environment (which is more the case in Western cultures as compared to non-Western cultures) would be more likely to interpret non-rectangular figures as representations of rectangles, thereby exacerbating these types of visual illusion (see Segall, Dasen, Berry, & Poortinga, 1990, for more discussion). Segall and colleagues extended Brunswik’s work by showing that culture is a prime source of experience that causes different habits of inference to arise. More generally, it also reinforced the notion that the ecology has an important impact on even basic processes such as visual perception.

The role of ecological factors in shaping psychological processes was further explored by Berry and colleagues’ cross-cultural studies of psychological differentiation, a concept that was developed by Witkin and colleagues (Witkin, Dyk, Faterson, Goodenough, & Karp, 1962). Witkin’s work illustrated an important contrast between individuals who are field-independent—who largely rely on internal frames of reference and work on the environment by analyzing or restructuring it—and individuals who are field-dependent, who largely rely on external frames of reference and accept the environment as a given rather than analyzing or restructuring it. Witkin developed numerous creative methods to test such differences including the rod and frame task (in which subjects need to adjust a rod, itself embedded in a frame that is inclined by 28° to a vertical orientation) and the embedded figures test (in which subjects have to locate a simple figure within a more complex one). Across both types of tasks, Witkin illustrated wide variability in how much individuals’ judgments were affected by the context in which objects were embedded, with field-independent individuals being better able to extract a constituent part than field-dependent individuals. Later work also illustrated the role that context has in shaping social judgments. For example, field-dependents were more sensitive to contextual cues and more empathic whereas field-independents were more independent and autonomous (Witkin & Berry, 1975).

Berry and his collaborators were among the first to examine the construct of psychological differentiation across cultures within the context of a more general ecocultural framework wherein the ecology was theorized to shape socialization processes which in turn affected behavior. Berry (1966) showed, for example, that in tightly-structured agricultural settings (e.g., the Tenne of Sierra Leone), which emphasize compliance in child-rearing practices, individuals exhibited lower psychological differentiation as compared to individuals in hunting and fishing settings (e.g., Eskimos) that were more loosely structured and which emphasized self-assertion in child-rearing. Similarly, Dawson (1967a, 1967b) found that in groups that had strict discipline (e.g., the Tenne), children were more likely to develop a field-dependent cognitive style as compared to groups that have more lenient child-rearing practices (e.g., the Mende of Sierra Leone) (see Berry, 1979, and Witkin & Berry, 1975, for summaries of this work). The early work on culture and psychological differentiation was a precursor of work on culture and cognition in social psychology by Nisbett and colleagues in the 1990s, discussed at length below. This early work also set the stage for Berry’s more elaborated ecocultural model (Berry, 1975), which was clearly influenced by Kardiner, Linton, and Whiting, though Berry expanded their models to include population-level and individual levels of analysis (see Berry 1975; Berry et al., 1992; Segall et al., 1990, for in-depth discussions of the ecocultural model).

Triandis’ work in the 1960s and 1970s was arguably the first to incorporate a wide range of social-psychological concepts in the study of culture and thus had an important influence on modern-day cross-cultural psychology. Triandis was highly influenced by the work of Melville Herskovits (1955), who had defined culture as the human-made part of the environment which consists of physical (e.g., tools, bridges, educational systems, religious institutions) as well as subjective elements (e.g., beliefs, attitudes, norms, values). In the Analysis of Subjective Culture, Triandis (1972) set out to further explore “subjective culture” and developed methods, for the first time, to systematically study social psychological constructs such as categorizations, associations, attitudes, beliefs, expectations, roles, and norms across cultural groups. Triandis argued that the basic element for the study of culture is categorization and that members of different cultures have unique ways of categorizing experiences. For example, in assessing who is a member of one’s ingroup, some cultures use criteria such as people who were born in the same place, or belonged to the same tribe, race, social class, religion, or who were blood relatives. In other cultures it is people who “think like I do.” Triandis also argued that members of each culture have unique ways of associating one category with another. For example, is “socialism” referring to a political party, an ideology, or both? In addition, cultures differ in the kinds of perceived antecedent-consequent relationships that people use (e.g., if you have “hard work” then you have “progress”; if you have “progress” then you have “health”), attitudes (e.g., is “democracy” good or bad?), beliefs (e.g., “democracy” results in good health;
or results in an impoverished society), expectations (e.g., if there is democracy then there is poverty), ideals (e.g., widows should not be passionate), memories (e.g., I remember the names of each of my cows), norms (e.g., members of this society give their seat to old people), role perceptions (e.g., the mother-son role is warmer than the father-son role in this culture), stereotypes (e.g., lower class people are less intelligent), tasks (e.g., to make this tool one has to first get some redwood), values (e.g., “security” versus “freedom” is all-important), among other concepts.

In an analysis of data from the US, Greece, India, and Japan, it became clear that coherent themes cut across these different elements of subjective culture. One such theme Triandis identified was the relative importance of the group versus the individual in different cultures, a theme that was later labeled “individualism-collectivism” by Hofstede (1980). For example, as compared to the data from the US, data from Greece illustrated much more of a contrast between behaviors aimed towards the ingroup versus behaviors aimed towards the outgroup, which is a theme that turned out to be a major characteristic of collectivist cultures (Triandis, 1995). Foreshadowing the large literature on culture and self that developed in social psychology in the 1990s (reviewed below), Triandis (1972) found that Greeks’ self-definition depended on the way ingroup members saw the person, thus individuals’ worth was defined by the group. By contrast, Americans’ self-definition depended on the way individuals saw themselves. Greeks also perceived behaviors in context to a greater extent than did Americans, an attribute that later proved to be a key characteristic of collectivist cultures.

In addition to exploring cultural differences in patterns of the psychological foundations of subjective culture, another major contribution of the Analysis of Subjective Culture was that, similarly to Berry and Whiting, it placed the thematic elements of subjective culture into a larger ecological and historical framework. The theoretical framework that was developed included distal antecedents (e.g., climate) and historical events (e.g., wars), proximal antecedents (e.g., occupations, language used, religion), and immediate antecedents of action (which included all the elements discussed previously), which result in patterns of action (see Figure 23.1). In all, the Analysis of Subjective Culture set the stage for large-scale studies on dimensions of culture such as individualism and collectivism that took hold in the 1980s.

Throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s, there was a growing institutionalization of the field of culture and psychology, in part because of the research reviewed above, but also through a series of conferences, newsletters, and societies that were formed during this time period. In January 1967, Herbert Kelman and Henri Tajfel organized a conference in Ibadan, Nigeria in order to develop research collaborations between Western and non-Western scientists. As President of the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues, Kelman made clear his goal to increase collaboration among psychologists around the world (Triandis, 1997). As detailed by Triandis (1997), many first-generation cross-cultural psychologists attended the meeting, including Angelini, Ayman, Berrien, Campbell, Diaz-Guerrero, Dobb, Heron, Jahoda, Klir, Kornadt, Fishman, Price-Williams, Segall, M. B. Smith, and Triandis, and the results of the conference were published by Kelman and Smith (1968) in the Journal of Social Issues. The conference also indirectly produced other important scholarly products that served to further institutionalize the field of culture and psychology. For example, at the conference, Marshall Segall proposed the establishment of a newsletter to communicate developments in culture and psychology and further connect scholars from around the globe (Triandis, 1997). The first edition of this newsletter, which appeared in March 1967, was edited by Harry Triandis (see www.iacep.org/bulletin/V31.1_1997/history.html). Its purpose was described as helping to foster visits between psychologists from developed and developing nations, to describe new research programs, to delineate calls for cross-cultural replications, and to list new books and articles that detail the results of cross-cultural social psychological studies.

Thereafter, other major developments during the half decade between 1966 and 1970 that helped to institutionalize the field included the launching of the International Journal of Psychology, the initial directory of cross-cultural psychological research (Berry, 1968), and the inauguration of the Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology in 1970. Much of the research done in the field up until the mid-1970s was reviewed in the seminal six-volume Handbook of Cross-Cultural Psychology which was edited by Harry Triandis. The handbook was a first of its kind in its breadth and depth, with volumes devoted to perspectives (William W. Lambert), methodology (John Berry), basic processes (Walter Lonner), developmental psychology (Alastair Heron and Elke Kroeger), social psychology (Richard Brislin), and psychopathology (Juris Draguns). A separate volume on culture and human development (Munroe, Munroe, & Whiting, 1981) was also published and attests to the vast amount of cross-cultural research conducted at the time.

As evidence grew regarding culture-variability of human behavior, the need to establish the methodological and ethical standards by which such evidence would be judged also grew. Anthropological methods of participant observation, which aimed to make general statements about the personality found in a culture, were unconvinced to psychologists interested in documenting individual-level processes (Klineberg, 1980). Yet methods developed by psychologists (e.g., experiments, surveys) also had notable problems when being transported to other cultures. As a result, much of the 1970s and later years focused on how cross-cultural psychology should be done, marshalling a large psychometric and methodological tradition that still has its influence in modern-day cross-cultural psychology. Distinctions of etics (culture-general) and emics (culture-specific) (based on phonetics and phonemics; Pike, 1954), began to be discussed, with concerns about “imposed etics” (theories and instruments) being transported across cultures (see Berry, 1969; see also Berry et al., 1992). Concerns with rival hypotheses (Malpass,
1977), biases in sampling (Lonner & Berry, 1986), the nature of experimenters and tasks employed (Berry, 1980), choice of language (Bennett, 1977; Bond & Cheung, 1984; Marin, Triandis, Betancourt, & Kashima, 1983), translations (Berry, 1980; Brislin, 1980; Werner & Campbell, 1970), response biases (Van de Vijver & Leung, 1997), and levels of analysis (Leung, 1989), among others, became critical concerns of the field, so much so that an entire volume of the Handbook of Cross-Cultural Psychology was devoted to methodological concerns in transporting any method across cultures. Indeed, cross-cultural psychology, even by the later 1970s, was still arguably more defined by its methods than its theory (Kim, 1994). At the time, there was also increasing attention to the topic of ethics in conducting cross-cultural research. The notion of “intellectual colonialism,” whereby social scientists collect data in other cultures and then fail to give back to local collaborators, was discussed widely at the 1967 conference in Nigeria (Triandis, 1997) and ultimately led to the seminal Tapp report, a comprehensive treatise on the ethics of cross-cultural research (Tapp, Kelman, Triandis, Wrightsman, & Coelho, 1974).

Although the field of cross-cultural psychology was developing rapidly during this period, it is fair to say that it remained
largely separated from mainstream psychology in general and social psychology in particular. To be sure, there is some evidence during this time that culture work was starting to infiltrate the mainstream. Kluckhohn wrote a chapter on "Culture and behavior" in the first edition of the 1954 *Handbook of Social Psychology*. Klineberg's (1954) textbook, *Social Psychology*, devoted much discussion to cross-cultural approaches, in part inspired by his extensive contact with Boas, Sapir, Benedict, and Mead (Klineberg, 1980). Also, Barrett and Bass (1976) also wrote a treatise on how culture affects organizational phenomena in the *Handbook of Industrial and Organizational Psychology*. Nevertheless, culture research at the time was still more of the exception than the norm in mainstream psychology, and was largely "tolerated" rather than embraced (Gelfand, Erez, & Aycan, 2007).

**Culture and psychology: The 1980s and beyond**

It was during the 1980s and 1990s that culture began to emerge as a major research area in psychology. In large part this was due to theoretical and methodological advances, yet it was also propelled by a fertile social, economic, and political ground that called out for social psychological research on cultural differences. With the globalizing economy, the unprecedented exchange of people and resources across national borders created a mutual need for knowledge about other cultures around the world. It is perhaps not a coincidence that Geert Hofstede, an organizational psychologist working for a multinational corporation, provided a broad framework of cross-cultural comparison in his 1980 book, *Culture's Consequences*, based on his surveys about work values of IBM employees from more than 40 countries around the world. He identified four cultural dimensions—power distance, individualism and collectivism, masculinity and femininity, and uncertainty avoidance—on which each cultural group may be located. Power distance indicated the extent to which people tolerated power differences in society; individualism and collectivism capture relative emphasis placed on individuals or groups; masculinity—femininity referred to the extent to which gender-based roles were clearly differentiated; and uncertainty avoidance indexed the degree to which uncertainty was met with anxiety and clear rules of conduct were preferred. Cultures around the world—largely equated with nation-states as political units—can be placed within this multidimensional space. Despite criticisms, the importance of Hofstede's (1980) study for cross-cultural research cannot be overestimated, as it was the first large-scale empirical project that put these abstract constructs on the empirical map. As such, it provided a "conceptual roof" under which existing studies could fall, as compared to the atheoretical stance that had previously characterized much of the cross-cultural literature.

Of Hofstede's four dimensions, individualism and collectivism became the focal point of empirical research in psychology. Hofstede described individualism as a cultural pattern that emphasizes the individual's goal pursuit and wellbeing, whereas collectivism places importance on the sustenance of a collective such as an extended family or a kinship group. Hofstede's characteristics of individualist and collectivist cultures echoed well-known concepts such as Tönnies's *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*, or Durkheim's mechanical and organic solidarity, which these founding fathers of social science developed to describe social and cultural changes from the traditional lifestyle to modern society in Western Europe in the late 19th and early 20th century. Hofstede's data also showed that North America, Western Europe (e.g., the UK, the Netherlands, Italy, Denmark), and Oceania (Australia, New Zealand) are more individualistic, whereas Asia (e.g., Pakistan, Taiwan, Thailand) and Latin America (e.g., Venezuela, Colombia, Chile) are more collectivistic. Also noteworthy was his finding that individualism correlates with national wealth. More individualistic countries tend to be richer, and the more collectivistic countries tend to be poorer, highlighting the empirical link between culture and economy (for summaries of research on Hofstede's dimensions, see Hofstede, 2001; Hofstede & Hofstede 2005; Kirkman, Lowe, & Gibson, 2006; Leung, Bhagat, Buchan, Erez, & Gibson, 2005; Taras, Kirkman, & Steel, 2010).

In many ways, Hofstede's research program became a prototype for subsequent large-scale cross-cultural research programs using a well-crafted survey instrument that covers broad areas of values, norms, and attitudes across multiple cultures. One of the most notable research programs is Schwartz and colleagues' (Schwartz, 1992, 1994; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1990) landmark study of human values across over 44,000 teachers and students in 54 countries. In this research program, a broad set of human values is measured by a survey instrument, which is designed not only to cover the same ground as individualism and collectivism, but also to provide more nuanced understandings about broad motivational orientations. For instance, in the Schwartz Value Survey, there are 10 value domains including power, achievement, hedonism, stimulation, self-direction, universalism, benevolence, tradition, conformity, and security; within this broad semantic space, individualism and collectivism can be discerned. This instrument has been used in a large number of countries, thus providing a profile of values for each country, enabling an examination of relations among variables at the country level of analysis (e.g., GDP, GINI index, political and health indices).

Other researchers began to use similar methods—a survey instrument with a large sample of cultures based on national boundaries—to examine cultural variability in values, attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors, from a number of different perspectives. For instance, Smith, Dugan, and Trompenaars's (1996) study of conservatism versus egalitarian commitment and utilitarian involvement versus loyal involvement, the Chinese Culture Connection (1987), the GLOBE project on cultural dimensions at the societal and organizational level (House, Hanges, Dorfman, & Gupta, 2004), the project on social axioms (Leung & Bond, 2004), and tightness-looseness (Gelfand, Nishii, & Raver, 2006; Gelfand, Raver, Nishii, Leslie, & Lun et al., 2011) all followed the same general theoretical approach. Research
programs also developed that showed that cultural patterns vary within national cultures—most notably work on the culture of honor in the US North and South (Nisbett & Cohen, 1996). Collectively, this research continues to provide increasingly nuanced views of cross-cultural variations around the globe.

The emergence of the standard theory of cultural comparisons

Harry Triandis (1989) published his review and theory of the research following Hofstede (1980) and other relevant research in *Psychological Review*, which began a series of major theoretical contributions that have dominated the subsequent cultural comparative research. Expanding on Hofstede's cultural dimension of individualism and collectivism, he theorized a critical link between the macro-level cultural difference in individualism and collectivism (among other cultural dimensions such as cultural tightness and complexity) and the micro-level psychological process of the self and social behavior. According to Triandis, depending on a culture's level of individualism and collectivism, different types of conceptualizations about one's self—self-concepts—tend to be more prevalent in a society. In individualist cultures, people are more concerned about individuals than about groups, and therefore they generate more thoughts and ideas about the individual. These thoughts and ideas are expressed in a variety of artifacts such as novels and movies. Likewise, in collectivist cultures, people think more about their ingroups, such as families to which they belong. Again, artifacts are constructed to reflect those beliefs and values. As a result, private self-concepts (cognitions about oneself as a unique individual) are more prevalent in individualist cultures, whereas public and collective self-concepts (cognitions about oneself as publicly presented to other people and as a member of a social group, respectively) are more prevalent in collectivist cultures. Furthermore, people tend to learn and use self-concepts that are more prevalent in their society. That is, the more prevalent a type of self-concept is, the more likely it is to be activated in people's minds, and people tend to act in accordance with the activated self-concept. This way, culture influences the prevalence of different types of self-concept, which then affects the likelihood that different self-concepts are learned and activated. Social behavior is therefore influenced by culture through the activation of different types of self-concept. Triandis also later developed vertical and horizontal distinctions of individualism and collectivism (see Triandis, 1995; Triandis & Gelfand, 1998).

Markus and Kitayama (1991) further extended Triandis' theory by specifying the psychological implications of culturally shaped self-concepts. They suggested that there are two types of self-concept, which they called independent and interdependent self-construal. According to them, people with an independent self-construal regard the self as bounded and separate from others. The independent self is a unitary and stable entity, which is characterized by its private and inner attributes (e.g., honesty, kindness). For independent people, it is important to express their unique self, promote their own personal goals, and assert what is on their mind. This is Triandis' private self. In contrast, people with an interdependent self-construal regard the self as connected to significant others (e.g., daughter, husband) and ingroups (e.g., a citizen of a country, a member of a political party). For interdependent people, it is important to belong and fit in, occupy their proper place, engage in appropriate action, promote others' goals, and "read other people's mind." Markus and Kitayama further explicated concrete implications of activating different self-construals for cognitive, emotional, and motivational processes. This conflates Triandis' public and collective self. Markus and Kitayama's main contribution was to spell out concrete ways in which culturally shaped self-concepts differ from each other, and to provide a theoretical framework for investigating the relationship between those self-concepts and behavior. Strictly speaking, independent and interdependent are types of self-concepts, and individualism and collectivism are types of cultures; therefore, in individualist cultures, independent self-construal is more likely, whereas in collectivist cultures, interdependent self-construal is more likely. However, these concepts tend to be used interchangeably.

More recently, Nisbett, Peng, Choi, and Norenzayan (2001) argued that culture differs in the prevalence of different types of cognitive style. When an object is perceived and thought about, it is always placed against its background. In other words, people's perceptual experience tends to include both the figure and its ground. However, people with different cognitive styles have a sharper or a broader focus on the object. People with an analytical style focus their attention and thought sharply on the object while largely ignoring its background. In contrast, people with a holistic style have a broader focus of attention and thought, so that the object and its context are both included in the perceiver's construal of the object. In societies populated by people with independent self-construals, people are more likely to direct their attention to the individual person while disregarding his or her social context. By contrast, in societies populated by people with interdependent self-construals, people learn to direct their attention to the person as embedded in his or her social context, including his or her significant others and important groups. As a result, people develop ontology (i.e., metaphysical theories about the world) and epistemology (i.e., theories about knowing and the nature of knowledge) that are consistent with these cognitive styles. They also develop styles of conflict resolution that are consistent with their cognitive styles. So, people with an analytical style prefer to resolve social conflict by rules and argumentation whereas people with a holistic style prefer compromises and negotiation. Through these cultural and social tendencies, the cognitive styles become general tendencies to perceive and cognize any objects, whether they be social objects such as people and groups or nonsocial objects such as atoms and physical things in the world. Expanding on John Berry's cross-cultural extension of psychological differentiation discussed previously, this perspective is a more contemporary and generalized conception of cultural
differences between the West and the Rest as outlined by Levy-Bruhl (1923, 1985/1910) nearly a century before.

Thus, the standard theory of cross-cultural differences emerged. It provided a theoretical framework in which a number of empirical investigations have been conducted about differences among national cultures. Of these, the most prominent have been comparisons between North America and East Asia in the 1990s and since. Consistent with the strong theorizing about cross-cultural differences in self-concept, there is direct evidence for individualist or independent North America and collectivist or interdependent East Asia. Kashima et al. (1995) compared self-concepts in America, Australia, Hawaii, Japan, and Korea, and found that Americans and Australians had more individualist and less collectivist self-concepts than Japanese and Koreans, with Hawaiians between these two groups. Rhee, Uleman, Lee, and Roman (1995) asked European Americans, Asian Americans and Koreans to describe themselves in their own words, and found that European Americans’ self-descriptions contained the highest proportion of personality trait terms and Koreans’ the lowest, with Asian Americans’ in the middle, again suggesting the American tendency to characterize the self with individual-centered descriptors.

One of the memorable empirical contributions from the cross-cultural research concerns cultural differences in social cognition, or in particular, what is known as the fundamental attribution error—people’s tendencies to attribute the cause of an individual’s behavior to his or her dispositional characteristics rather than the context in which the behavior occurred. Social psychological research in the 1960s and 1970s, mainly conducted in North America, showed that people in the experiments have a strong tendency to explain someone else’s behavior (e.g., writing an essay about a political issue) in terms of the person’s disposition (e.g., political opinion) while underestimating the importance of the context of the behavior (e.g., someone with a legitimate power told him to write an essay taking a certain political stance). Although this tendency was said to reflect a limitation of the human cognitive system, it turned out to be an error often observed in North America, but not necessarily elsewhere. Miller’s (1984) comparison between the USA and India as well as Morris and Peng’s (1994) comparisons between the USA and Hong Kong showed that the error was not so fundamental after all, and that Indians and Chinese do not exhibit this tendency as strongly as their American counterparts.

Cultural differences between North America and Asia were found not only in cognitive processes, but also in emotional processes (see Diener, Diener, & Diener, 1995; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Matsumoto & Hwang, 2010). A large-scale cross-cultural project comparing people’s happiness—often called subjective wellbeing—showed a large difference between North America and East Asia: North Americans rate themselves as happier than do East Asians (e.g., Diener et al., 1995). Paralleling these findings, cross-cultural comparisons of self-esteem—people’s evaluations of their worth—typically showed a strong tendency for North Americans to have higher self-esteem than Japanese (Heine, Lehman, Markus, & Kitayama, 1999). Related to this finding is an optimism bias—people’s tendency to estimate their own likelihood of experiencing positive events to be greater and of encountering negative events to be less than the average other. There was a robust optimism bias in North America and Western Europe, but the optimism bias was found to be much weaker in East Asia, especially in Japan (e.g., Heine et al., 1999). In all, these findings show a clear cultural difference in how people express their feelings about their lives and themselves. These differences are typically interpreted as stemming from differences in self-concept—individualists optimistically pursue their happiness, whereas collectivists’ pursuit of happiness is tempered by their sense of obligations for others.

Thus, a body of theoretical and empirical work has given a more or less coherent picture of cultural differences in psychological processes. Different types of self-concept are more or less prevalent in different parts of the world; people en-culturated in different societies are likely to acquire different types of self-concepts; culture influences social behavior through the activation of a type of self-concept; and through the acquisition of different attentional processes and cultural meaning systems, different cognitive styles became more prevalent. In total, culture, self, and basic psychology of perception, thought, and emotion are all intricately linked in human experience and action. Beyond the individual level of analysis, cultural differences were also shown to affect a wide range of interpersonal and organizational processes, including conflict, negotiation, justice, work motivation, leadership, and team dynamics (see Aycan et al., 2000; Barrett & Bass, 1976; Bond & Smith, 1996; Erez & Earley, 1993; Gelfand & Brett, 2004; Gelfand et al., 2007; Gibson & Zellmer-Brunn, 2001; Kirkman & Shapiro, 1997, for examples). Despite Wundt’s founding dissociation between experimental psychology for basic psychology and Völkerpsychologie for higher-order cognition, culture does not appear to be just about higher-order cognition, but has a deeper implication for human psychology as a whole.

Nonetheless, there have been critical appraisals of this literature from conceptual (Takano & Osaka, 1999) as well as from methodological perspectives (Heine, Lehman, Peng, & Greenholtz, 2002). In their meta-analytic review, Oyserman, Coon, and Kemmelmeier (2002) concluded that “We found support for reliable cultural differences. However, these differences were neither as large nor as systematic as often perceived” (p. 40). Data analytic concerns aside (Schimmack, Oishi, & Diener, 2005), one could read this as a glass half full, or half empty, depending on the perspective. What is critical at this point is theoretical and methodological refinements surrounding the individualism and collectivism dimension (e.g., Triandis & Gelfand, 1998; Kashima et al., 2004), a further expansion of research areas beyond the relation between the individual and the collective. Culture covers a far greater terrain of meaning space than this dimension, and a greater sophistication in theorizing culture–mind relations is needed.
Beyond the standard paradigm: Cultural, indigenous, and evolutionary approaches in culture and psychology

Many other approaches to culture and psychology have developed alongside, and in some cases in direct opposition to, the standard theory of cultural comparisons.

Cultural and indigenous psychologies

Hofstede’s and other work in “cross-cultural psychology” was primarily an empirical, bottom-up contribution to culture and psychology. Around the same time, a more metatheoretical, top-down contribution to the study of culture began to emerge. Richard Shweder began to publish a series of influential theoretical essays criticizing cross-cultural psychology as a discipline of psychology that takes a universalist stance and whose main mission is to establish and test a universal theory of human psychology. Shweder defended a new subdiscipline that he called cultural psychology, which takes cultural meaning seriously, espousing a more particularistic Counter-Enlightenment view of culture. Setting up investigation of culture as a “Romantic rebellion” against the Enlightenment mainstream (Shweder, 1984), he mounted a polemic in which he declared, “A discipline is emerging called ‘cultural psychology.’ It is not general psychology. It is not cross-cultural psychology . . . It is cultural psychology. And its time may have arrived, once again” (1990, p. 1). It is fair to say that Shweder’s early criticism gave a strong injection of cultural anthropological thinking into the field of culture and psychology. His insistence on the mutual constitution of culture and mind focused researchers’ attention on how culture shapes human mind, and in turn how the mind makes culture. Although the label of cultural psychology had been around beforehand (e.g., De Vos & Hippler, 1969, and much longer before then in the German Romantic tradition as discussed earlier), it failed to gain much currency. It was Shweder’s vision of cultural psychology in opposition to cross-cultural psychology that set the stage for the subsequent development in cultural comparative research.

Nonetheless, it is important to recognize that several other influential formulations of cultural psychology emerged as well. Some were expressly stimulated by Shweder’s lead (Cole, 1996) whereas others were less obviously so. While launching his version of cultural psychology, Jerome Bruner (1990) cited Shweder’s 1990 piece in his Acts of Meaning, the published version of his Jerusalem–Harvard Lectures delivered at the Hebrew University in 1989. It was a reconfiguration of his earlier “New Look” spirit in perception within the post-Cognitive Revolution era of psychology. In the 1950s, Bruner orchestrated a “New Look” approach, which pointed to the significance of meaning in perception. While this and other movements gave rise to the cognitive revolution, which was “intended to bring ‘mind’ back into the human sciences” (p. 1), he suggested that it had achieved “technical successes at the price of dehumanizing the very concept of mind it had sought to reestablish in psychology” (p. 1). Lamenting that the original cognitive revolution lost its original impulse for meaning, Bruner sought to usher in “a renewed cognitive revolution—a more interpretive approach to cognition concerned with ‘meaning-making’” (p. 2). Indeed, this too was a call to take meaning seriously, and to bring the spirit of the cultural science model of psychology into the contemporary research on cognition. Coming from the doyen of general psychology, Bruner’s call was more firmly rooted in mainstream general psychology and cognitive science, while all the while being critical of the computational cognitive science of the time. His research drew freely on a variety of human science disciplines, if in a manner that some may describe as dilettantism.

Of all the versions of cultural psychology, Michael Cole’s (1996) is most strongly influenced by Vygotsky’s legacy. Originally trained as a mathematical psychologist steeped in probabilistic learning theory, Cole’s sojourn in Liberia opened his eyes to the importance of culture in psychological processes. Cole locates human development (understood as the totality of ontogenesis including cognitive, social, and other aspects), squarely in the cultural–historical context, and argues that human ontogeny, history, and phylogeny are all mutually constitutive. The central theoretical concept in Cole’s cultural psychology is that of context. He sees the current human context as a joint product of its evolutionary and historical past. Yet the human capacity for foresight and planning brings a perceived future into the mix. He refers to the coexistence of the past and a perceived future in the present as prelepsis. In this perspective, context to a large extent consists of culture, which is defined as artifacts produced by the humans’ species-specific activities of the past generations. It includes language as materialized in speech and writing, technological tools, and other human-made objects. The artifacts, broadly conceived, are not sheer material objects, but also carry the information about the makers’ intended uses; they significantly shape people’s interpersonal activities, which, when internalized, become intrapersonal psychological processes. Therefore, cultural artifacts simultaneously enable children and adults to develop their skills and abilities and constrain their development by channeling their activities in certain directions rather than others. In shaping the development of children, culture shapes the genesis of the next generation. To Cole, culture preleptically mediates future. Cole’s cultural psychology is tenaciously context-specific; he urges us to look into the specific human activities in situ as a proximal antecedent to human cognition. Although he points to a possibility of context-general cultural psychology, and there certainly is a possibility (Laboratory of Comparative Human Cognition, n.d.), it remains to be seen how this may develop.

Taking the same sociohistorical circumstances as its starting point, it is noteworthy that indigenous psychology emerged. In the volume entitled Indigenous Psychologies, which is plural in emphasizing the understanding that psychological knowledge is culture-specific, Kim and Berry (1993) defined indigenous psychology as “the scientific study of human behavior (or the
mind) that is native, that is not transported from other regions, and that is designed for its people” (p. 2). While keeping an intellectual impulse that is similar to cultural psychology—endorsement of the Counter-Enlightenment and a yearning for an integration of the natural and cultural science models—this movement is more strongly “indigenous” in that it emphasizes the research conducted by people with their native cultural background, using their indigenous cultural concepts, and for the people of that culture facing their political, economic, and social circumstances. The volume contains chapters by Duran and Singh on India, Rogelio Diaz-Guerrero on Mexico, James Geogas in Greece, Pawel Boski on Poland, Fathali Moghaddam on Iran, Virgilio Enriquez on the Philippines, David Ho on China, among others—each of whom was a renowned researcher from a particular cultural group writing about his or her own culture and psychology (also see Kim, Yang, & Hwang, 2006, for more recent developments). In many ways, indigenous psychology was an intellectual movement in parallel with cultural psychology. It set itself up in opposition to the mainstream Enlightenment discourse. However, if cultural psychology was indigenous to the North American and Western European intellectual traditions and history, indigenous psychology was indigenous to the rest of the world—mainly those societies and cultures that are less economically advantaged than those in North America and Western Europe.

In all, the intellectual movement including both cultural psychology and indigenous psychology was a self-conscious reclaiming of the Counter-Enlightenment tradition and the cultural scientific model of psychology. Different theorists developed divergent trajectories of argument—some a criticism against cross-cultural psychology, others a critique of the contemporary cognitive science, and still others an argument for a strongly context-specific and developmental approach. Nonetheless, they all took their cues from the ongoing discourse in other disciplines of humanities and social sciences—that the postmodern era had dawned thanks to advancing information technology (Lyotard, 1979), that positivism as a philosophy of science was now replaced by a new epistemology, and that there was a general “interpretive turn” (Rabinow & Sullivan, 1979), referring to the return of the cultural scientific model of inquiry in social sciences. Commenting specifically on Bruner’s cultural psychology, the doyen of cultural anthropology, Clifford Geertz (2000, p. 196) noted that bringing culture into psychology:

amounts to adopting a position that can fairly be called radical, not to say subversive. It seems very doubtful that such views... can be absorbed into the ongoing traditions of psychological research (or indeed into the human sciences generally) without causing a fair amount of noise and upheaval.

Geertz’s comment was informed by the centuries-old clashes between Enlightenment and Counter-Enlightenment.

Whether his ominous prediction will be borne out has yet to be seen. Nonetheless, the current practice in much of research in culture and psychology tends to be free of many of the shortcomings to which the strong postmodern critique of empiricist epistemology was directed (Kashima, 2005), and the noise and upheaval that Geertz predicted is yet to materialize. Indeed, the decade following the publication of Hofstede’s (1980) milestone saw a flurry of cross-cultural research in psychology. Figure 23.2 shows the result of a simple search of the PsycINFO database with the keyword culture, published in psychology journals for each decade from 1960 to 2010. The percentage of articles published on culture shows an increasing trend, although it remains at the relatively low level of around 2%. Arnett’s (2008) recent analysis also shows that psychological research appearing in journals published by the American Psychological Association tend to focus on Americans, who represent only about 5% of humanity. Thus, there remains a greater need for psychology to incorporate culture into its theoretical and empirical purview.

Dynamic approaches to culture and psychology

In contrast to the standard theorizing in culture and psychology, which took its main objective to be a theoretical delineation of cultural differences in psychological processes, there emerged another research tradition, which may be broadly called dynamic approaches to culture and psychology. As Kashima (2000a) noted, cultural comparative research requires
researchers to conceptualize culture as if it is a system of meaning residing in the mind that is relatively stable over time. In contrast, many of the developmental researchers of culture and psychology were more concerned about how culture is internalized in the mind, which in turn is externalized into culture (e.g., Cole, 1996). The latter concern gives rise to the notion of culture that is more process-oriented though dynamic and perhaps even haphazardly in flux. Three general approaches in this vein exist in the contemporary culture and psychology literature, which we briefly describe below.

Sociohistorical approaches to development

The sociohistorical research tradition in child development has made a significant contribution to the dynamic approach to culture and psychology by encouraging research attention to the sociocultural basis of cognition. As Rogoff and Chavajay (1995) outlined, the cross-cultural comparative work in the 1970s gave way to Vygotsky-inspired theoretical analysis and empirical investigation in the 1980s of how concrete sociocultural activities and practices give rise to cognitive processes. Rogoff and Chavajay summarized this work as follows:

Scholarly work on culture and cognition in the 1990s focuses on questions of how participation by individuals in certain cultural practices relates to participation in others, how cognition involves communication in the context of institutional and cultural practices, how learning involves transformations not only of skills but of identity, how development involves creation of new forms as well as use of given forms, and how communities and individuals manage diverse practices across overlapping or separate institutions and communities.

(p. 873)

In short, this was an endeavor to locate human cognitive activities within broader sociocultural activities, which consist not only of historically constituted institutions such as home, school, and work, but also of individual actors’ concrete actions and interactions. Through participation in these everyday activities people acquire the totality of their psychological processes, which in turn constitute the very sociocultural activities that continuously mediate their future cultural context. For instance, Rogoff, Paradise, Arauz, Correa-Chávez, and Angelillo (2003) described intent participation as prototypical activities in which children acquire their cognitive processes (including language use) by intently observing and listening to adults’ activities and conversations often without formalized instruction, and contrasted it to assembly-line instruction (i.e., typical institutionalized schooling) where children are segregated from adults’ sociocultural activities and formally instructed about abstract cognitive and language skills. Intent participation is more prevalent within less industrialized and more traditional societies whereas assembly-line instruction is more prevalent in more industrialized societies. The differences in activity types through which children acquire cognitive processes can explain cultural differences in their performance on cognitive tasks (see Rogoff, 2003). Broadly capturing these sociocultural differences in terms of independence and interdependence, Greenfield, Keller, Fuligni, and Maynard (2003) argued for two broadly defined developmental pathways in individualist and collectivist cultural contexts (also see Keller, 2007).

Culture priming

In contrast, more social psychologically oriented researchers developed a rather different dynamic approach owing many of its theoretical concepts and empirical methodology to social cognition, the dominant paradigm in social psychology since the late 1970s. A paper by Trafimow, Triandis, and Goto (1991) is arguably the origin of this research tradition. This work was informed by Triandis’ conception of culture in his 1989 paper that regards culture as a collection of concepts (considered very broadly, including psychological constructs such as attitudes, beliefs, norms, and behaviors), from which individuals sample a particular salient concept at the time of psychological engagement. Combining this with the well-established research on concept priming (e.g., Srull & Wyer, 1980; Schwarz & Strack, 1981), Trafimow et al. sought to make salient (i.e., prime) the individual or collective self-concepts by getting their participants to read a brief story in which a general makes his decision on the basis of various actors’ individual characteristics or their family connections and other group-based considerations. Their research found that the priming of individual vs. collective concerns made it more likely for participants to mention the individual or collective aspects of their self-concepts in their verbal self-descriptions. Thus, it appears that cultural tendencies such as individualism and collectivism can be primed.

Subsequently, this work was further developed into two general strands. One expanded the scope of the priming of cultural orientations and its consequences. Brewer and Gardner expanded the independent variable side by attempting to prime three different aspects of self-concepts—individual, relational, and collective selves (e.g., Brewer & Gardner, 1996); others attempted to extend similar procedures to psychological processes other than self-concept activations, such as values (Gardner, Gabriel, & Lee, 1999), cognitive processes (Kühnen & Oyserman, 2002), and the like. The other strand extended this research by priming the whole of a culture rather than a particular aspect of the culture such as individualism–collectivism. Hong, Morris, Chiu, and Benet-Martinez (2000) argued that in today’s globalizing world, many people are bicultural and hold different types of cultural information in their minds. These bicultural individuals can switch their cultural mind sets easily and seamlessly. Salient cultural icons–iconic images of a culture such as the Great Wall for China and the Statue of Liberty for the US—would put these individuals into one or the other cultural mindset (e.g., US–Chinese biculturals into the Chinese or American mindsets), which primes some specific aspects of a culture at the same time. Consistent with their reasoning, bicultural Hong Kong Chinese primed with the Chinese (US) icons showed a cognitive tendency more in line with the
Chinese (American) pattern. Hong et al. called their approach “dynamic constructivism,” which takes the dynamic flexibility and constructive nature of the mind seriously (Chiu & Hong, 2007). The culture priming research has produced results that are generally consistent with the cross-cultural comparative work, suggesting that cultural orientations may be temporarily made salient to produce psychological effects that are comparable to more chronic cultural differences (Oyserman & Lee, 2008).

Neodiffusionism

There is an additional metatheoretical orientation on the dynamics of culture that may be called neodiffusionism. Diffusionism is a culture theory that was popular briefly in the early 20th century. In this perspective, culture was a collection of human inventions that were created somewhere, and diffused through human population by migration, adoption, or conquest. Although this early theorizing went out of favor, various theories that combine this basic idea with Darwinian evolutionism began to appear in the 1970s and 1980s. One of the early proponents of this idea was Donald Campbell (1975), who argued that human culture evolves through the process of random variation and selective retention. Subsequently, a number of theories emerged that regard cultural evolution as analogous to genetic evolution. Despite their significant differences, Dawkins’ (1976) meme theory and the dual inheritance models developed by Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981) as well as Boyd and Richerson (1985) are all instances of this approach. In contradistinction to these theories, Sperber’s (1996) neodiffusionist theory regards cultural evolution as occurring through a non-Darwinian process. Nonetheless, common across these theories of culture is their commitment to the notion that culture is socially transmitted information.

Kashima and his colleagues (2000b; Lyons & Kashima, 2003) began to develop a social psychological research program on cultural transmission in a neodiffusionist perspective. They used Bartlett’s (1932) serial reproduction paradigm to examine how cultural stereotypes—stereotypes about a social group shared within a society—may be reproduced in the process of transmitting gossip-like narratives. In particular, they showed that there is a strong tendency for people to reproduce information that is consistent with their cultural stereotypes in the long run. Even though stereotype-inconsistent information may be better transmitted early on, it tends to drop off out of memory relatively quickly, and stereotype-consistent information tends to remain in stories retold through serial reproduction chains. Their later work (Clark & Kashima, 2007) showed that the reproductive advantage for stereotype-consistent information was due to its perceived utility in forming and maintaining social relationships, suggesting that the culture-maintaining transmission style may serve a social integrative function. Although this program has been mainly concerned with stereotypes, its utility may extend to other domains of culture.

Culture as social psychology; social psychology of culture

This brief historical exposition of culture and psychology makes one thing abundantly clear. Many of the contemporary developments in culture and psychology have been heavily influenced by theories and research grounded in social psychology. In a way, this is not surprising. After all, as Triandis originally noted, culture is by definition a social phenomenon consisting of shared realities, categories and stereotypes, norms, values, and beliefs—all concepts that have been central to social psychology as a discipline. Indeed, the current state of culture and psychology cannot be understood without a somewhat more focused treatment of social psychology and culture’s place within it.

Social psychology as a subdiscipline of psychology has a number of characteristics in common with mainstream psychology. The Enlightenment and Romantic strands of intellectual traditions have coexisted in social psychology; nonetheless, logical positivism (or its Popperian variant) as a prototypical Enlightenment philosophy of science had a strong grip on social psychology although its contemporary rendition is much weaker on logic and has more of an evolutionary epistemological flavor (see Campbell, 1974). However, the Gestalt tradition set at the beginning of social psychology by Lewin, Asch, and Heider, as well as its relatively peripheral location within the discipline (and bordering with other social science disciplines), made social psychology uniquely open to possibilities of theoretical integration with the study of culture. It was with this spirit that the contemporary social psychology of culture came into existence. Perhaps most symbolic is Triandis’ (1964) publication, “Cultural Influences upon Cognitive Processes,” as the first article in the first volume of the celebrated series, Advances in Experimental Social Psychology. Integrating the natural scientific method of psychological inquiry (note the Experimental in the name!) with the cultural scientific instinct, Triandis’ work provided a platform from which to launch the contemporary social psychology of culture.

In retrospect, culture research may be construed as a wedge that split experimentation as a method from the aspiration for universality in the natural science model of psychological inquiry. In the ideal typical natural scientific model, experimentation was a method that stripped all the local, particular, and presumably superfluous properties away from the locus of inquiry, while retaining the essential aspect of the phenomenon under scrutiny, and hence, the equation of experimentation with universality. Triandis’ use of experimental method broadly conceived (although the Cambridge Expedition to Torres Strait Islands used experimental methods in cultural comparative research) showed that there was no pragmatic impediment to the use of experimentation for examining cross-cultural variability. The subsequent development of social psychology of culture as traced above—individualism—collectivism research, the standard theory of cultural comparisons, the more recent developments of culture priming, neodiffusionist theorizing,
and so on—is clearly marked by this combination of experimentation as a method and cultural meaning as a topic of inquiry.

Nevertheless, an aspiration for universality continues in experimental social psychology. This is a legacy of the natural science model. In this view, the goal of psychological inquiry is to establish a theory of a phenomenon; namely, a set of law-like propositions that can logically generate a causal explanation of the phenomenon. In the typical formulation of this position, these law-like propositions were not to be "contingent," but rather universal. That is, they should not be contingent on some particular conditions, but should be universal statements that apply under all conditions. This school of thought typically takes the following form: Social psychological phenomena have both psychological process and psychological content. Whereas culture may influence psychological content, there remain universal psychological processes. Cultural inquiries can investigate content, whereas other inquiries in social psychology can investigate processes. This is a variant of so-called syntactic theories of mind, according to which there exists a universal syntax of the mind and semantics—meaningful contents—are grafted on top of this universal machinery.

There can be several different positions in this general school of thought. One possibility is a pure Enlightenment stance, which may argue for a separability of process and content, and asserts the primacy of process over content. In this view, there is no need for cultural investigation of psychological process; all that is needed is a method that can strip meaning or content from psychology. This is a caricature, which few, if any, contemporary social psychologists seem to take. A second stance may be an enlightened Enlightenment stance, which claims a separability of process and content, but suggests that process and content can be investigated separately, and each type of investigation can proceed independently of the other. Many of the contemporary social psychologists seem to adopt this view. A third possibility may be an anti-Enlightenment stance, in which a separability of process and content is maintained, and the supremacy of content over process is asserted. No one seems to take this third stance, however.

There exists another school of thought, which denies the process-content separation as untenable, or worse, meaningless. In this view, all psychological processes include content, and the processes and their contents cannot be separated; to the extent that content differs across cultures, psychological processes must differ as well.

Finally, there can be another school of thought, which regards process-content separation as a hypothesis that needs to be tested through theoretical investigation. Those who adopt this line would ask the question, how deep does culture cut into social psychological phenomena? Whether there exist some universal processes that operate on contents that culture supplies is an empirical question rather than a metaphysical assertion.

Whichever school of thought one takes, a universality claim—that a certain theory holds universally across all cultures—is no different from any theoretical claim that requires empirical tests. Just as any theory that has survived all the past empirical tests may be rejected in the next empirical investigation, any theory that has been tested in multiple cultures and survived them can in principle be rejected in the next culture. Any claim to universality by a social psychological theory is only a working hypothesis just as any theory in fact is. Suppose that one takes an enlightened Enlightenment stance, and develops a social psychological theory that postulates a set of universal processes and cultural contents. With more empirical tests in multiple cultures and cumulated failures to reject the theory, its universality claim would strengthen; however, there is always a possibility of the proverbial next culture that may end up providing a strong challenge. Nonetheless, it may still be possible to construct a newer version of the theory (à la Lakatos & Musgrave, 1970), which postulates a revised set of universal processes and mechanisms. This process of theory development and testing can continue indefinitely. More pragmatically, when applying any social psychological theory that postulates universal psychological processes in a new cultural context, it is prudent for researchers or practitioners—those who assume its validity and investigate its derivations or design policies and interventions—to test the theory’s validity. This is because the new cultural context could just be that proverbial next culture that challenges its universality claim.

Concluding remarks

As this brief exposition about history of culture in psychology attests, the conceptions of culture and its theoretical treatment in psychology have endured and also changed over the time span of centuries. The themes of the Enlightenment and Counter-Enlightenment conceptions of the person, which coconstitute the models of psychological research, have been gradually separated from each other, and transformed from a set of tightly configured ideological clusters into a broad set of much less tightly clustered ideas and practices. Moreover, it is our belief (or perhaps hope) that researchers into culture and psychology are beginning to blur the opposition between experimental and interpretive approaches to inquiry as so fundamental. Those researchers who take cultural meaning very seriously make use of experimental methods to bring out cultural meaning systems such as individualism and collectivism. Cultural meaning may be examined and analyzed not only by interpretive methods, but also by experimental methods. Those researchers who examine cultural evolution make use of formal mathematical modeling. The opposition does not seem to have the compelling force that it used to have. The system of meaning defined by the Enlightenment and its counterpart does seem rather dated by now.

With the blurring of such distinctions, it is possible to see that culture is obviously, and paradoxically, a dynamic stability that endures and yet changes over time. The process-oriented and system-oriented conceptions of culture complement, rather than contradict or oppose, each other. A critical question we see on the agenda for the future is what makes it possible for culture
to be both dynamic and enduring—how concrete individuals in interaction in situ with their natural environment and with each other can generate something that seems like a context-general system of meaning (Kashima, 2000a).

Another important item for future research is the different time scales in which cultural dynamics unfold, as the contemporary development of culture and psychology seems to regard evolution, history, and ontology in different temporal perspectives. Surely they require different theoretical perspectives and specific research methods. Nonetheless, research questions are not framed in terms of evolution versus history or ontology (i.e., nature vs. culture), but in terms of their coconstitution, and how both evolutionary and historical processes constitute the current sociocultural context which humans are born into and develop in over time, and which they in turn construct. In this perspective, evolutionary underpinnings of culture (what genetic makeup of humans makes it possible for them to have an elaborate culture; e.g., Tomasello, 2003) as well as genetic components of existing culture (what genetic influences may exist in the constitution of some cultures; e.g., Chen, Burton, Greenberger, & Dmitrieva, 1999) emerge as significant research questions. These biological strata of culture turn researchers' attention to embodiment and neural correlates of culture—which coincide with theoretical and methodological developments in neuroscience (e.g., functional magnetic resonance imaging, transcranial magnetic stimulation, electroencephalography technologies), prompting the field of culture and psychology to expand its toolbox of research methods to include not only the traditional methods of qualitative and quantitative inquiry, but also more technology-intensive research tools (see Chiao, 2009).

If culture and psychology are considered to be mutually constitutive processes that unfold over time, the data analytic and theoretical platforms may need to be extended considerably. The typical method of data analysis—general linear model and its multilevel extensions—may need to be extended by incorporating time series analyses. Likewise, the typical medium of theory construction—natural language—may need to be augmented significantly by other types of symbolic system. In the theorization of dynamics, mathematics of a system of nonlinear differential equations, often called dynamical systems theory, plays a significant role (e.g., Hirsch, 1984). More recently, computational social sciences that use agent-based modeling approaches have emerged as another way forward in constructing dynamic theories of cultural evolution (e.g., Axelrod, 1997; Miller & Page, 2007). It seems that the investigation of culture and psychology has entered a new era; the centuries-old pattern of metatheoretical, theoretical, and methodological discourse has been gradually transformed into new patterns. The launching of the new Advances in Culture and Psychology series (edited by Gelfand, Chiu, and Hong) is a symbol of the fact that culture research across the discipline of psychology—regardless of its theoretical, empirical, and epistemological perspective—can now be found in the same 'intellectual home.'

In closing, the era of rapid globalization of the 1990s and concomitant intercultural contact and exchanges in economic, political, social, and cultural arenas helped to show its strain in the form of the Asian Meltdown (1997), which rapidly developing economics in Asia ran into financial strife. Against the backdrop of this contemporary human context, the culture concept continued to be prominent as a darling of popular and academic discourse. In academic discourse, civilization and culture became synonymous as in Tylor's original definition. When Huntington (1996) wrote about The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order he did not mean the Enlightenment sense of civilization as the highest form of human society; by "civilizations" he meant large clusters of cultures around the world. That is, all humans have their cultures, not just those in remote parts of the world "untouched by the civilization." Culture, thus, has become a hallmark of humanity, critically distinguishing Homo sapiens from other animal species believed to be without culture. Nonetheless, just as in the Counter-Enlightenment discourse of culture, one element of this paradigm persists. In the contemporary discourse, the culture concept continues to act as a counterpoint to universality. Different groups of humans have different cultures. With the 2001 tragedy of the September 11 attacks on The World Trade Center, arguably a symbol of globalization, the ideas of cultures and particularities of human social groups were throtlted into the contemporary discourse as a matter of urgency.

Notwithstanding the contemporary political, economic, and otherwise more broadly social contingencies interwoven with these human activities, the research tradition of culture and psychology will surely continue and will add to the rich history outlined in this chapter. Where it goes in future is, of course, in part the researchers' own making.

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Note

1. Experimentation in this context refers to a broad set of methods that include "true experiment" in the Campbell sense, i.e., random assignment to more than two conditions, as well as other correlational methods with standardized measurement procedures. In this sense, the hallmark of "scientific methodology" in the present context is probably the use of standardized procedures for manipulation, observation, and control of variables.

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