War and Peace in East Asia: Sino–Japanese Relations and National Stereotypes

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National stereotypes may provide a useful social psychological perspective in which to consider intergroup relations between national groups. Autostereotypes and heterostereotypes of China and Japan were explored to shed light on one of the most critical intergroup relations in East Asia, namely Sino–Japan relations. Chinese and Japanese undergraduate students see themselves as likeable and warmer than the other, though they both view Japan to be more competent than China. We also examined hypotheses that current stereotypes may reflect shared perceptions of the past international conflicts, and may be influenced by the way people frame the international circumstance of their own country—namely, whether to regard it as linked to Asia or to the Pacific Rim. Moderate support was found for these ideas. Chinese who regarded past Sino–Japan conflicts as more important tended to have a more negative autostereotype, but Japanese who did so held a somewhat more positive autostereotype. Japanese students who linked Japan to the Pacific Rim more strongly held more positive stereotypes of themselves and Chinese, although there was no relation between this belief and stereotypes among Chinese students.

Naming of a geographical region is a delicate matter. The eastern portion of the Eurasian continent is usually called East Asia. Yet, this naming at once enables and constrains our imagination. On the one hand, it reminds us of the region’s connection with Asia—its cultural, economic, and political associations with the ancient civilizations of India and the Fertile Crescent of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, and farther to Europe and Africa. On the other hand, this naming plays down the perspective of the Pacific Rim, which places the region at the western shore of the Pacific Ocean. Beyond its vastness lie the West Coast of North and South America to the east and the Philippines and Indonesia, as well as Australia and New Zealand to the south. East Asia and the Pacific Rim constitute complementary perspectives, a figure and a ground, which frame our imagination about war and peace of the region, and intergroup relations among peoples of China, Japan, Korea, and Vietnam. Of those, one of the most critical is that between China and Japan as two major political, economic, and military powers in the region. National stereotypes held by Chinese and Japanese about each other can provide a social psychological perspective in which to understand this critical relation.

STEREOTYPES AS DYNAMIC CONFIGURATIONS

Stereotypes are representations about social groups that are culturally shared within a social group (e.g., McIntyre, Lyons, Clark, & Kashima, 2003; Stangor &

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1This section draws on the writings of Berger and Borer (1997), Fairbank, Reischauer, and Craig (1989), Gibney (1992), and Murphy (1997) as accessible English-language texts on East Asia.
Schaller, 1996). For a given bilateral intergroup relation, heterostereotypes refer to one group’s view of the other group, and autostereotypes are one group’s view of oneself. When viewed as cognitive representations, stereotypes are group impressions as dynamic configurations that evolve over time (Kashima, Woolcock, & Kashima, 2000). As people encounter information about the target groups through direct interaction with their members or indirect hearsay about them (Bhoenke, Frindte, Reddy, & Singhal, 1993), stereotypes develop as structured representations of the target groups. Nonetheless, not only are stereotypes held by individuals, but are also shared by a number of people within a large-scale collective. Because of this culturally shared nature, stereotypes enter into a number of societal processes. Those who share a stereotype tend to communicate information consistent with the stereotype in the long run, so that stereotype consistent information tends to circulate in a social network (Lyons & Kashima, 2001; Ruscher, 1998). When making a collective decision, a group tends to rely more heavily on shared information (Stasser & Titus, 1985, 1987), implying that socially shared stereotypes are likely to influence collective decisions.

Stereotypes held by a group of people, therefore, evolve in response to information about the target groups that becomes available within that group. Whether members of the stereotyping group have direct interaction with members of the target group or only receive information second hand from others in the group, the information about the target groups is likely to reflect the intergroup relation between the stereotyping and the stereotyped groups. Conflict-laden intergroup relations increase the availability of negative information, whereas cooperative intergroup relations increase the circulation of positive information. Stereotypes would thus dynamically reflect the current intergroup relations (Oakes, Haslam, & Turner, 1994; Sherif, 1967; Tajfel, 1981). Social psychological research provides ample evidence for this proposition. For instance, as Karlins, Coffman, and Walters (1969) noted, American undergraduates’ stereotypes about Japanese changed from “intelligent,” “industrious,” and “progressive” in Katz and Braly (1933), through “imitative,” “sly,” and “extremely nationalistic” in Gilbert (1951), back to “industrious” and “ambitious” in 1969, mirroring the United States–Japan relationships before, during, and after World War II (1941–1945). Seago’s (1947) study tracing Americans’ stereotypes of the Japanese from 1941 to 1945 also showed their deterioration following the Japanese attack of Pearl Harbor in 1941.

In addition, stereotypes have a significant temporal dimension, reflecting people’s views about the past history and future possibilities of intergroup relations (Diekman & Eagly, 2000). Stereotypes are likely to reflect the past intergroup relations. Liu and his colleagues (Liu, Lawrence, Ward, & Abraham, 2002; Liu, Wilson, McClure, & Higgins, 1999; Liu et al., submitted; also see Hilton, Erb, Dermot, & Molian, 1996) noted that history often provides shared representations with which, and symbolic context in which, people construe their own social identities. To the extent that people’s understanding of history is constitutive of their
views of themselves, which are closely related to autostereotypes, it may affect their views about their outgroups (i.e., heterostereotypes) as well. Stereotypes are also likely to be related to people’s views about future possibilities. Diekman and Eagly (2000) showed that gender stereotypes reflect the relation between men and women—namely, perceived distribution of social roles of breadwinners (traditionally male role of bringing home income) and child raisers (traditionally female role of staying home and raising family). Those who thought men and women are likely to occupy these roles equally in the future tended to have less stereotyped views about men and women. It appears that people’s views about a future, namely, what sort of world is possible and probable, can affect the content of the stereotype.

If stereotypes reflect past, present, and future intergroup relations, what types of intergroup relations generate what type of stereotype contents? Fiske and her colleagues (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002; Fiske, Xu, Cuddy, & Glick, 1999) suggested that status differentiation and competition between the groups are reflected in the competence and warmth dimensions embedded in stereotypes. When a target group is seen to be higher in status than the perceiver’s ingroup, the target stereotype tends to be viewed as competent (as opposed to incompetent). If a target group is in competition with the ingroup, it is seen to be cold (as opposed to warm). According to Fiske et al.’s (2002) analysis, stereotype content is associated with a specific intergroup orientation. A competent and warm group is viewed with pride and admiration; a competent and cold group provokes envy and jealousy; an incompetent and warm group invokes pity and sympathy (a kind of paternalism); and an incompetent and cold group is held in contempt and disgust.

CHINESE AND JAPANESE MUTUAL STEREOTYPES

Given these considerations, what are mutual stereotypes held by Chinese and Japanese? Because of the cooperative relation between China and Japan in the recent past, one may expect relatively positive mutual heterostereotypes in terms of warmth. Nevertheless, one of the most salient aspects of the past is that of international conflicts in the early part of the 20th century (see Liu et al., submitted). Japan developed an imperialist regime in the late 19th century and destabilized the region, challenging China (Sino–Japanese War, 1894–1895) and Russia (Russo–Japanese War, 1904–1905), eventually annexing Korea and Taiwan in 1910. After the First World War (1914–1918), the Japanese military expansion into China continued through the occupation of Manchuria (1931) and the military aggression in Shanghai (1932). In fact, Japan’s military aggression in the war era framed its past intergroup relations with other countries in the Asia and Pacific region as well. The Japanese expansion culminated in the bombing of Pearl Harbor, and the Pacific War (1941–1945), which eventually engulfed countries such as the Philippines, Indone-
Asia, as well as Australia. Given this historical background, Chinese heterostereotypes of Japanese may be relatively more negative than may be expected from the current intergroup relation.

In addition, the complementary perspectives of Asia and the Pacific Rim—the one that focuses on the continent and the other that highlights the ocean—may provide two different frames of reference (Turner, 1987). The framework of Asia represents the continuity with the past, a self-contained regional history due to East Asia’s relative geographical seclusion from other parts of Eurasia, by the Inner Mongolian steppe desert, the high mountains of the Himalayas and Pamirs, and other mountainous regions to the north and south. On the other hand, the framework of the Pacific Rim points to an alternative framing that acknowledges the roles potentially played in the region by Southeast Asia, Oceania as well as the West Coast of North and South American continents. Although the Pacific Rim is not a widely circulated concept, the recent creation of a political forum such as Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation suggests itself as a viable possibility.

From a social psychological perspective, all other (e.g., economic and political) things being equal, the Asian and the Pacific Rim perspectives differ from each other in variability within them and availability of a third party in case of international crises. The Pacific Rim contains a great diversity. It clearly includes China and Japan as two potentially competing major economic and political powers in the region, but it also contains other Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries such as the United States, Canada, and Australia. The cultural diversity in the Pacific Rim is much greater than that in East Asia, including English and Spanish speaking countries with strong cultural ties to Western Europe, as well as the Chinese influenced East Asian countries. The diversity within the frame of reference may have a strong effect on understandings of the Sino–Japanese relation. A potential intergroup rivalry between China and Japan can be reframed within a potentially greater intergroup differentiation between the East and the West. Within this context, intergroup differences between China and Japan may be much diluted and replaced by the intragroup similarity within the group of Asian countries. As well, the presence of the United States, Canada, and Australia in the Pacific Rim makes available an internal third party that could act as a peace broker in case of international incidences between China and Japan. By contrast, there is no inside, third party peace broker for China and Japan in Asia per se.

2A number of atrocities were committed by the Japanese military during this period, many of which were directed at civilians and POWs. Well known among them include the enlisting of so-called comfort women, the devastation of Nanjing, and the forced labor of POWs for the construction of the Thai–Burma Railway.

3We thank Chick Judd for pointing this out.
THIS STUDY

This study examined mutual stereotypes held by Chinese and Japanese undergraduate students, arguably the next generation of people that will shape their future relation. The target countries were China and Japan as well as the United States and Australia. Stereotypes about these latter English-speaking countries were examined to include within the scope of the study the countries that belong in the Pacific Rim, but not in Asia, and to provide the context in which to compare mutual stereotypes held by Chinese and Japanese. To provide a preliminary test of the notion that current national stereotypes have temporal dimensions, and reflect past intergroup relations, people’s judgments of the importance of conflicts between China and Japan were measured. It was expected that those who place greater importance on past conflicts would hold more negative heterostereotypes. There was no clear expectation about the relationship between this measure and autostereotypes. Also to test the idea that people’s frames of reference can affect the current stereotypes, items were devised to tap the extent to which respondents believed that their country was linked to Asia and the Pacific Rim. Those who believed more strongly that their countries are linked to the Pacific Rim were expected to hold more positive autostereotypes and heterostereotypes. Again, there were no specific expectations about the link between Asian frame of reference and stereotypes.

METHOD

Participants

University students in People’s Republic of China (100; 66 men and 34 women; 21.41 years old) and Japan (99; 57 men and 42 women; 23.9 years old) were administered a questionnaire in classroom settings in 1997 and 1998. Chinese data were collected at Peking University in Beijing. The Japanese data were collected at two sites, Nara University in Nara (45; 17 men and 28 women; 22.57 years old) and Tsukuba University in Tsukuba (54; 40 men and 14 women; 25.56 years old). Nara is an old capital of the imperial Japan near Osaka and Kyoto. Tsukuba is a city near Tokyo, which is known for its university and other research-related facilities. Despite these geographical and other socioeconomic differences, there was no statistical difference between the two Japanese samples on the measures reported in this article. Analyses were conducted with the combined sample. All participants were citizens of, and native to, their respective country.

Material

A questionnaire was first developed in English, and then translated into Japanese and Chinese with backtranslation to check the equivalence of the translations. It
was constructed as part of a larger study, and contained items about demographic information (country of birth, citizenship, age, sex), general liking and national stereotypes of Chinese, Japanese, Australians, and Americans, views about conflicts between China and Japan, and framing of Asia and the Pacific Rim.

**General liking.** A 7-point bipolar scale was used to measure general liking of the four target groups, Chinese, Japanese, Australians, and Americans, anchored by 7 (likeable) and 1 (dislikeable).

**National stereotypes.** Seven-point bipolar scales were used to examine the warmth and competence dimensions of the national stereotypes of the same four groups. Warmth was examined by pairs, trustworthy–untrustworthy and cold–warm, and competence was tapped by hardworking–lazy, smart–stupid, and sophisticated–crude, with the first adjective in each pair as the left anchor and the second as the right anchor. The items were coded, so that the higher number (7) indicated warmth or competence.

**Historical significance of China–Japan conflicts.** As Liu and his colleagues (submitted) reported, people tend to nominate wars and major conflicts as important events in history. The significance of conflicts between China and Japan after the Meiji Restoration in human history was rated on a scale from “the most significant (100),” to “NOT significant at all (1).” Included were the Pacific War (1941–1945), World War II (1939–1945), and Sino–Japanese War (1894–1895). Both the Pacific War and WWII were included because, in some usage, WWII refers to the global conflict around the globe, whereas the Pacific War only refers to the war front in the Pacific.

**Framing.** We also examined the respondents’ framing of their country’s geopolitical link to Asia and to the Pacific Rim. Asia-centered and Pacific-centered frames were measured each by 7-point Likert scales ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) with regard to belongingness (My country belongs to Asia/PR), interdependence (My country and Asia/PR depend on each other), and shared history (My country shares common history with Asia/PR).

**RESULTS**

To facilitate the exposition, after reporting some preliminary analyses, we will first discuss the present and past of the China–Japan relation, reporting the results and providing discussion for general liking and national stereotypes in relation to the historical significance of China–Japan conflicts. We will then turn to potential futures of this issue by giving the results and discussion about general liking and national stereotypes in relation to framing.
Preliminary Analyses

Three sets of items were used to tap three classes of variables, national stereotypes, historical significance, and framing. Each set was then examined to see if they were suitable for aggregation to construct a composite measure. For each set, we followed a two-step procedure recommended by Van de Vijver and Leung (1997) in which (1) each item was standardized within each country, and (2) principal-axis factor analysis was conducted using the standardized items to identify underlying factors. With regard to national stereotypes, for each target group, the expected two-factor solution, warmth and competence, emerged following varimax rotation. The ratings on the two warmth related dimensions were averaged to compute the overall perceived warmth for each country. Likewise, the ratings on the three competence-related dimensions were averaged to measure the overall perceived competence. With regard to historical significance and regional beliefs, a single-factor solution was adequate for each. Cronbach’s α was computed for each relevant variable in each country, and reported in Table 1. Although the internal coherence of the scales was generally reasonable for a cross-national study, Cronbach’s α for warmth was very low. Nonetheless, for the analyses to be reported following, conclusions drawn by treating the two warmth items (trustworthiness and warm) separately were identical to those based on the aggregated scales. To simplify the exposition, we will report only the aggregated results.

Present and Past: Liking, Stereotypes, and History of International Conflicts

We examine the present and past of the Sino–Japanese relation. In particular, we first explore the present state of the China–Japan relation by examining the general

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National Stereotypes</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>Australia</th>
<th>USA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>W^a</td>
<td>C^b</td>
<td>W</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>W</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Decimal points are omitted.
^aWarmth (trustworthy, warm). ^bCompetence (hardworking, smart, sophisticated).
liking and national stereotypes, and then investigate the social psychological link of the perceptions about the China–Japan relation of the past to the current liking and stereotypes.

**Liking.** Chinese and Japanese students’ general liking of Chinese and Japanese was examined in comparison to their liking of Australians and Americans within a country (China–Japan) × target (China, Japan, Australia, and the United States) mixed-design Analysis of Variance (ANOVA), with country as the between-subject variable and target as the within-subjects variable. A significant interaction of country and target, Wilks’ $\alpha = .67$, $F(3,190) = 31.31$, $p < .001$, $n^2 = .33$, qualified a target main effect, Wilks’ $\alpha = .59$, $F(3,190) = 43.68$, $p < .001$, $n^2 = .41$. Relevant means are reported in Figure 1. Paired-sample $t$-tests were conducted for each relevant comparison. As expected, the Chinese sample liked Chinese people more than Japanese, $t(98) = 11.57$, $p < .01$, whereas the Japanese sample liked Japanese and Chinese almost equally, $t(96) = .028$, ns. Of interest, both Chinese and Japanese generally liked the Westerners. Chinese liked Australians at least as much as their ingroup (Chinese), $t(97) = 1.94$, $p = .06$, and liked Americans even more than their ingroup, $t(98) = 2.71$, $p < .01$. Japanese liked both the Australians and Americans even more than their ingroup (Japanese), $t(96) = 2.74$ and 2.71, both $p < .01$, respectively.

**National stereotypes of warmth and competence.** National stereotypes of the four targets were also examined within a country × target × dimension

![FIGURE 1 Chinese and Japanese means of liking ratings of Chinese, Japanese, Australians, and Americans.](image)
(warmth–competence) mixed-design ANOVA. There was a significant three-way interaction effect, Wilks’s Λ = .56, $F(3,191) = 50.36$, $p < .001$, $n^2 = .44$, suggesting that the pattern of the Chinese and Japanese samples’ perceptions of the targets depended on the dimension.4 Figure 2 reports the relevant means for warmth and competence.

As for warmth, both the Chinese and Japanese samples regarded their ingroup as warmer than the Japanese and Chinese, respectively; what was striking was that both Chinese and Japanese saw the Westerners as warm as or even warmer than their ingroup. In particular, Chinese people saw Australians and Americans as warm as their ingroup, $t(96) = 1.41$, $ns$, and $t(98) = .072$, $ns$, respectively. It was the Japanese whom Chinese saw as much colder than themselves, Australians, and Americans, $t(98) = 10.02$, $t(96) = 13.53$, and $t(98) = 11.76$, respectively, $p < .001$ for all. Japanese saw Australians as warmer than their ingroup, $t(97) = 3.96$, $p < .001$, and Americans as warm as their ingroup, $t(97) = 1.14$, $ns$. However, they saw Chinese as colder than their ingroup, $t(97) = 3.96$, $p < .01$, and also than Australians and Americans, $t(98) = 7.99$ and $t(98) = 4.70$, $p < .001$ for both.

However, the pattern of competence ratings was quite different. First of all, both the Chinese and Japanese samples rated Japanese as the most competent, followed by Chinese, Americans, and then Australians. More specifically, Chinese rated Japanese as more competent than themselves, $t(99) = 6.15$, though they considered their ingroup to be more competent than Americans and Australians, $t(99) = 3.83$ and $t(96) = 5.95$, $p < .001$ for both. Japanese rated their ingroup as more competent than Chinese, Americans, and Australians, $t(97) = 3.03$, $p < .01$, $t(97) = 4.19$, $p < .001$, and $t(97) = 6.91$, $p < .001$, respectively.

Relationship of the past with the present. The average perceived importance of the past conflicts between China and Japan was correlated with the present liking and national stereotypes held about Chinese and Japanese to examine the link between the perceived past and the present stereotypes. Table 2 reports the correlations. Most important, the perceived importance of the past conflicts correlated positively with the liking about Japanese in Japan, but negatively with the liking about Japanese in China. In other words, those Japanese who regarded their international conflicts with China as a significant part of their history tended to be nationalists who liked Japan; those Chinese who considered their wars with Japan to be important tended to dislike Japanese presumably as aggressors in those interna-

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4There were additional main and two-way interaction effects; however, they are uninterpretable due to the higher order three-way interaction effect involving cross-overs. The main effects were due to country, target, and dimension, $F(1,193) = 13.39$, $F(3,191) = 31.31$, and $F(1,191) = 73.49$; $p < .001$, $n^2 = .07$, .12, and .28, respectively. Two-way interactions of country × dimension and target × dimension were significant, A= .85 and .36, $F(3,191) = 35.51$ and 111.56, both $p < .001$, $n^2 = .16$ and .64, respectively.
FIGURE 2 Chinese and Japanese means of warmth, and competence ratings of Chinese, Japanese, Australians, and Americans.

TABLE 2
Correlations Between Perceived Importance of Past Sino–Japanese Conflict and Attitudes Toward Chinese and Japanese

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sample Target</th>
<th>Liking</th>
<th>Warmth</th>
<th>Competence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>−.06</td>
<td>−.07</td>
<td>−.24*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>−.20*</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>−.11</td>
<td>.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>.23*</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < .05.
tional conflicts. Another intriguing finding is that the perceived importance of the past conflicts negatively correlated with the perceived competence of Chinese in China, though it did not significantly correlate with that in Japan.

Nonetheless, it is important to recognize that the result provides only weak support for the idea that current stereotypes reflect past history, as measured by the importance of past wars. Most of the significant correlations are only moderate in size; correlations of this measure of past history with warmth of any stereotypes were small and nonsignificant.

Framing of the Sino–Japanese relation

We examined people’s beliefs about the extent to which they regarded their country to be part of Asia or the Pacific Rim, which would reflect their framing of their country’s intergroup relations. As indicated in Figure 3, in both countries, the participants regarded their country to be more part of Asia than part of the Pacific Rim. A country (China—Japan) × region (Asia—Pacific Rim) mixed design ANOVA was conducted on people’s frames of reference. There was only a significant main effect of region, Wilks’ $\alpha = .68$, $F(1,197) = 90.92$, $p < .001$, $n^2 = .32$. No other effect was significant, clearly indicating that both Chinese and Japanese frame their country’s place in terms of Asia rather than the Pacific Rim at this point in time.

Are people’s frames of reference related to their current stereotypes? To examine this, these beliefs were correlated with stereotypes of China and Japan in each country. Table 3 reports the correlations. In both countries, people’s beliefs that their country is closely tied to Asia were correlated with the perception of warmth about their own country. Those Chinese who thought their country belonged to

![Figure 3](image_url)
Asia saw their own country as warm; the Japanese participants who thought Japan belonged in Asia regarded their own country as warm as well.

Framing of the Pacific Rim correlated positively with the Japanese liking of China and Japan as well as their perception of the warmth of these countries. Among Japanese undergraduates, the Pacific Rim may represent a desirable positive framing in which both Japan and China look likeable, warm, and competent. There was no significant correlation involving framing of the Pacific Rim for Chinese.

**DISCUSSION**

This examination of national stereotypes held by Chinese and Japanese students about China, Japan, Australia, and the United States may provide a useful overview that enables us to examine how university students understand the current Sino–Japan relations, one of the critical axes around which regional stability of East Asia did and is likely to revolve. There exists a pattern for a competitive intergroup relation between Chinese and Japanese at least in the minds of these university students, that is, ingroup liking and outgroup disliking especially for Chinese. However, for both Chinese and Japanese, the Westerners from Australia and the United States are likeable. Supposing that both Chinese and Japanese would regard Australians and Americans as outgroups, this pattern suggests that both groups of East Asian students regard people from the English-speaking nations as their allies and friends.

When the Chinese and Japanese national stereotypes of China, Japan, Australia, and the United States are examined in terms of competence and warmth, the re-
results suggest a potentially competitive Sino–Japan intergroup relation. Chinese students regard Japanese as competent but cold and untrustworthy people; Japanese students see Chinese as not so competent and not so warm people. These mutual heterostereotypes are striking against the background of their shared stereotypes of Australians and Americans as fairly warm and less competent peoples around the Pacific Rim. If the Chinese stereotypes of Japanese imply a feeling of threat, the Japanese stereotypes of Chinese smack of an image of conceit. Because these data were collected before the current recession of the Japanese economy, the national stereotypes of Japanese may have changed since then. Nonetheless, these stereotypes are unlikely to change dramatically in a short period of time.

The perceptions of the past conflicts between China and Japan do have some effect on the present autostereotypes and heterostereotypes. The war history may be a glorifying moment for Japanese, as implied by the positive correlation between importance of the past conflicts and Japanese liking of themselves. Some extreme right-wing elements in Japan tend to glorify the Japanese military history after the Restoration of the Imperial Power in 1868. Perhaps we are finding a distant echo of this historical link between the wars and nationalism in Japan. In contrast, for Chinese, it seems to be a regrettable stain in the long history of China, which casts a shadow on the perceptions of both Japanese and Chinese themselves. Albeit weakly, the significance of the wars negatively predicts the Chinese liking of Japanese, and negatively predicts the Chinese autostereotype of competence. The history of the wars may remind Chinese about some of the war atrocities committed by the Japanese military during its occupation, as well as the humiliation suffered as a result of the military invasion.

The results offer some support for the notion that framing of intergroup relations can affect stereotypes. In both China and Japan, the participants’ country was seen to be more part of Asia than of the Pacific Rim. Clearly, Asia represents a social reality that is more strongly entrenched in the undergraduates’ thinking than the Pacific Rim. Intriguingly, those who have stronger beliefs that their countries belong in Asia tended to see their own country (i.e., Chinese about China and Japanese about Japan) as warmer and more trustworthy. This pattern may reflect the Chinese and Japanese beliefs that they are both Asians. However, the Chinese and Japanese who framed their country’s place in terms of Asia did not necessarily see Japan and China in a more positive light, respectively, suggesting that their views about Asianness of themselves did not extend to Japan for Chinese or to China for Japanese.

Among Japanese, framing of their country in terms of the Pacific Rim was related to stereotypes about Japan and China. The stronger their beliefs, the more positive their views were about Japan and China. However, in China, there was no relation between Pacific Rim framing and stereotypes. This contrast is striking. The Japanese undergraduates who regarded the Pacific Rim as a meaningful entity
saw their own country as well as China in a more positive light. By contrast, presumably, the Chinese undergraduates are not accustomed to thinking of China as part of the Pacific Rim. The absence of significant correlations suggests that the Pacific Rim to them is not an important concept in thinking about China’s place in the world.

Clearly, for Japanese students, the Pacific Rim provides a more desirable framing than Asia. By contrast, Chinese students’ stereotypes were not closely linked to their framing about either the Pacific Rim or Asia. Then, to what framing would their stereotypes be linked? One uninteresting possibility is that the measures were not as reliable in China as in Japan. However, as Table 1 shows, that was not the case. One interpretation is that the Chinese undergraduates do not see their country to be linked to any particular region, but only to the world. As the fastest growing economy of the world and a potential superpower that could possibly rival the U.S. military and economic forces in the future, in the students’ thinking, China may be tied to neither Asia nor the Pacific Rim. An alternative interpretation is that the Chinese undergraduates were not thinking very much about their country’s position in the wider international context in considering themselves or their next door neighbor, Japan.

**For a Stable Sino–Japan Relation**

To be sure, the results of this study provide only preliminary support for the ideas that past history of conflicts and framing of intergroup relations between China and Japan are reflected in the current stereotypes held by Chinese and Japanese. As well, the current data reflect views of a small sample of university students in their respective country, requiring much caution in generalizing to the overall populations of Chinese and Japanese. Nonetheless, what support there is implies that, for a stable intergroup relation between China and Japan, and regional stability in East Asia more generally, the idea of the Pacific Rim as an integral political–economic system may be usefully promoted at least in Japan. To begin, at least for the Japanese undergraduates, arguably the next generation that is likely to shape the future Sino–Japan relation, the Pacific Rim represents a desirable framing of the relation, though it does not seem to be quite a reality. Both their own self-image and the image of China were more positive for those who believe their country belongs in the Pacific Rim. No doubt this correlation does not guarantee that the promotion of the Pacific Rim concept makes the stereotypes of Japan and China more positive for the Japanese. Nonetheless, if experimentally confirmed, it would make this case stronger.

Furthermore, although the idea of the Pacific Rim was not related to stereotypes in China, it does not appear to have any harmful consequence. There is an added benefit to promoting the importance of the Pacific Rim. If there is an international
tension between China and Japan, the United States, Australia, or both could act as a third party that can broker a peace deal between them. As pointed out before, the Pacific Rim includes diverse countries within itself, and the United States and Australia are two of such countries that give diversity to the region. Both Chinese and Japanese undergraduates like the United States and Australia, and see these countries as friendly and perhaps fairly competent allies (though not as competent as themselves). The existence of this built-in third party within the region as a legitimate participant in the region is a potentially useful safeguard for regional stability.

In contrast, the view that their country is both economically and politically an integral part of Asia has a positive link only with the Chinese and Japanese stereotypes about themselves. The results may be seen to indicate that the framing of their countries in terms of Asia turns both Chinese and Japanese inwards, toward themselves, but not necessarily toward each other. It may be the case that Asia is a reality that is more closely connected to the traditional view of the world. Clearly, much of these conjectures are just that, conjectures. More careful and thorough examination of national stereotypes and other related beliefs is necessary to draw stronger conclusions. Nonetheless, a prima facie case can be made for this line of research and thinking.

Concluding Remarks

All in all, the current stereotypes about China and Japan as well as other countries that could also play a significant role in the critical Sino–Japan intergroup relation may provide a useful conceptual window through which to consider regional stability in East Asia. As suggested, stereotypes have a significant temporal dimension. Some aspects of the past intergroup relation has some bearing on the current views about each other. Framing of the intergroup relations may have some implications about current mutual stereotypes. The stereotype concept when expanded both contextually and temporally is a significant conceptual tool for understanding intergroup relations. The contextual expansion of the stereotype concept involves an examination of stereotypes not only of the groups involved in the critical intergroup relation, but also within the context of other significant groups surrounding it. Its temporal expansion considers the critical intergroup relation in relation to its past and perhaps also of future possibilities.

REFERENCES


