CHAPTER 23

EXPLAINING AND PREDICTING CULTURAL DIFFERENCES IN NEGOTIATION

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We know that people from different cultures bargain differently, but what is it about culture that determines how negotiations unfold? Michele Gelfand, Laura Severance, C. Ashley Fulmer, and May Al Dabbagh demonstrate how the cultural context of the negotiation and the culture of the negotiators affect the interaction. This work identifies a number of future directions necessary in order to enhance our understanding of bargaining across cultures.

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Social conflict is universal. It occurs among chimpanzees (de Waal, 2001); spotted hyenas (Wahaj, Guse, and Holekamp, 2001); dolphins (Weaver, 2003); crayfish (Huber, Panksepp, Yue, Delago, and Moore, 2001); bees, ants, and other insect communities (Trivers and Hare, 1976); and many others. Conflict occurs across human history; evidence of conflict among humans dates to the appearance of humankind itself (Keely, 1996), with the first large scale organized warfare occurring in 2500 B.C. in upper Mesopotamia (Wilford, 2005).

It occurs across human cultures, from small-scale societies to modern nations (De Dreuand Gelfand, 2008). It occurs across levels of analysis—from the individual to interpersonal, group, organizational, and national levels. Across all of these diverse contexts, the fundamental question of how entities manage their interdependence has captured the attention of academicians among many disciplines and policy makers alike. Whether it is deciding where to go on vacation, the division of tasks in organizations, ownership of land, or feeding behavior among primates (Aureli and De Waal, 2000), understanding, predicting, and managing conflict are arguably among the most important challenges facing humankind.

Although the existence of social conflict is universal, the solutions to social conflict are highly culturally variable (see Brett and Gelfand, 2006, Gelfand and Brett, 2004, for reviews). In this chapter, we discuss how the cultural context of negotiation dramatically changes the game being played and the resultant processes that occur at the negotiation table. Despite the massive theoretical and empirical base that exists on negotiation (Gelfand, Fulmer, and Severance, 2010; Thompson, Wang, and Gunia, 2010), the scholarly literature on negotiation is exceedingly narrow in its global scope and in its assumptions about human behavior in negotiation. After reviewing the issue of limited scope, we discuss our view of cultural differences in negotiation as different goals and default strategies (Yamagishi, 2011) that develop as adaptations to particular ecological niches, for example, the physical and social environments in which humans are embedded. We discuss how many of the negotiators’ biases, motivations, and strategies that have been documented as universal facts reflect Western individuals’ adaptations to a particular (and unique) ecological niche. We contrast this with negotiating behavior in other ecological niches that illustrate dramatically different approaches to negotiation. We conclude with future directions and practical implications that are derived from this perspective.
THE WESTERN CONTEXT OF NEGOTIATION RESEARCH

The behavioral sciences, in general, and psychology, in particular, has long been criticized as being both culture blind, ignoring culture in its theory and research, and culture bound, being limited to largely Western samples (Bond and Smith, 1996; Triandis, 1994; for a review see Kashima and Gelfand, in press). More recent empirical data has shown precisely how narrow the breadth of psychological research is and how heavily it relies on researchers and participants from Western societies (Arnett, 2008), a group of people who have been described as “the WEIRDest people in the world” (Henrich, Heine, and Norenzayan, 2010) to indicate the fact that they are largely “Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic” (61). In an analysis of six major psychological journals published between 2003 and 2007, for example, Arnett (2008) found that 73 percent of the authors were from US institutions. Combining the United States with European and English-speaking countries, 98 percent of the authors were based in Western societies. Moreover, 68 percent of the samples in these studies were drawn from the United States, and 27 percent were in European and English-speaking countries. In other words, 95 percent of all the samples in the six major psychological journals were from Western societies.

We conducted a similar analysis of research on negotiation to examine whether this field also exhibits the tendency toward cultural centrism. As per Arnett (2008), we conducted a content analysis on the geographic distribution of the author affiliations and sample locations in the most recent literature reported on negotiation. We coded affiliations and samples of all papers in two expansive reviews of the literature: 1) An Annual Review of Psychology chapter by Thompson et al. (2010) which discussed the last 10 years of negotiation research, and 2) a chapter in the American Psychological Association Handbook of Industrial and Organizational Psychology by Gelfand et al. (2010) that also reviewed the latest developments in negotiation research (data is available from the authors). Consistent with prior studies (Arnett, 2008; see also Adair, Coelho, & Luna, 2002; Bauersman, 1997), we found that the United States, together with European and English-speaking countries, represented 95 percent of all the authors on papers cited in these reviews (with 77 percent of them from the United States and the rest from western Europe, the United Kingdom, Canada, Austral., and New Zealand), with the remaining authors being from Asia (3 percent) or Israel (2 percent). A full 90 percent of the samples on which these studies were based were from the United States and European, and English-speaking countries (with 74 percent of these from the United States, and within this sample, 88 percent of the samples were undergraduate, graduate, and master of business administration (MBA) students. The rest of the samples were mainly from Asia (6 percent) or Israel (2 percent). Participants in other nations in the Middle East, Latin American, or Africa made up roughly a total of 2 percent of all samples. By way of comparison, the proportions of the authors and samples in the United States and other Western countries in the field
of negotiation are somewhat higher than those in psychology as reported by Arnett (2008). There is no doubt that research on negotiation has been heavily dominated by Western authors and Western samples.

The limited focus in negotiation research on Western nations, and particularly Americans, should be alarming. Arnett (2008) pointed out that Americans make up merely 5 percent of the total world population, a percentage that is expected to continually diminish over coming years. Henrich et al. (2010) further proposed that the WEIRD samples are in fact outliers among the general human population. Given the different environments to which they are accustomed, Henrich and colleagues suggested that WEIRD people are unlikely to be representative of the rest of the world's population and may even be the worst samples from which to generalize scientific research.

There is accumulating evidence that even basic psychological processes are subject to considerable cultural variability, even in areas that would be assumed to be "hard wired" and universal. For example, in the domain of visual illusions, research on culture and psychology during the 1950s and 1960s by Segall, Campbell, and Herskovits (1966) was the first to systematically document that there is wide cultural variability in susceptibility. Their research, conducted in 15 countries, showed that Europeans were much more susceptible to classic visual illusions (e.g., the Müller-Lyer illusion). Segall and colleagues advanced the carpentered world hypothesis to explain these differences, which argued that individuals who experience a lot of rectangular angles in their environment (which is more the case in Western cultures as compared to non-Western cultures) would be more likely to interpret nonrectangular figures as representations of rectangles, thereby exacer-bating visual illusions. Segall and colleagues' work clearly showed that visual perception was adapted to the ecological contexts in which people are embedded.

Since then, a voluminous literature has shown that there are basic cultural differences in many domains, from color perceptions and spatial cognition to self-concepts, moral reasoning, and social and organizational behavior, and within this literature, Americans have been repeatedly found to be particularly unique as compared to other samples (see Henrich et al., 2010; Kashima and Gelfand, in press). In this chapter, we discuss the nature of how unique Americans might be in the domain of negotiation as compared to other samples. Because of dramatically different ecological niches, we argue that the game and default strategies that characterize Americans' negotiation behavior are not necessarily generalizable to people from different cultures (and even to samples that differ in social niches within the United States).

**Culture and Negotiation**

Observations that there are cultural variations in negotiation behavior have a long history. Herodotus (ca. 400 B.C.) observed the "strangeness" of how ancient Egyptians traded with the Greeks (Herodotus, Marincola, and de Selincourt, 2003),
and as early as the second century B.C., trade began to flourish among people of different cultures along the Silk Road that stretched from Rome to China (Ellisseff, 2000). In the twenty-first century, global interdependence requires that people negotiate on a daily basis across cultural boundaries. Whether it be travelers' negotiating at a local marketplace, employees managing their interdependence in global companies, diplomats working on critical peace accords, or soldiers working to collaborate with a diverse group on the ground, understanding how culture influences negotiation is critical to managing interdependence at all levels of society.

In this chapter, in explicating the link between culture and negotiation, we advance an ecologically rational view of culture and negotiation. More specifically, we assume that an important factor in the selection of a particular negotiation strategy is the perceived rationality of the strategy in a particular ecological context. By "rational" we mean that there is a match between the strategy and the ecological environment (Gigerenzer, 2005; Kruglanski and Gigerenzer, 2011). Strategies that are perceived as the most ecologically rational will be chosen in the negotiation (cf. Kruglanski and Gigerenzer, 2011). The perception of what is ecologically rational need not be of conscious awareness to negotiators; rather, it is often implicit and based on standard operating procedures in a particular culture that have worked in the past. Accordingly, we view observed differences in negotiation behavior across cultures as default strategies that have at some point adapted to the perceived ecological niche in which individuals are embedded (Yamagishi, 2010).

The theory has a number of more specific assumptions about cultural behavior in negotiation that are worth making explicit. It assumes individuals in any cultural context strategically adapt their behavior to align with the ecological environment—by which we mean the descriptive norms (typical values, beliefs, and behaviors) and structural constraints and affordances that are perceived to be widespread in a particular social niche—in order to be socially wise (Chiu, Gelfand, Yamagishi, Shytengberg, and Wan, 2010; Shytengberg, Gelfand, and Kim, 2009; Yamagishi, 2010; Zou, et al, 2009). Acting on one's assessment of the ecological environment is assumed to increase the likelihood of successful social coordination and enhance favorable outcomes (Festinger, 1951, 1954; Hardin and Higgins, 1996; Yamagishi, 2010). As noted by Chiu et al. (2010), "Intersubjective knowledge of what people in one's group believe affords useful heuristics for anticipating the normative responses of others...people who have learned to apply such knowledge can more accurately anticipate others' reactions to their actions, and hence, will behave more wisely when navigating the complicated interpersonal terrain" (4). Given that an individual's success is exceedingly unlikely without the involvement of other cultural actors, particularly in negotiation, social coordination and thus norm-based behavior are essential to the accomplishment of one's goals. Acting on one's perceptions of what others will believe to be normative is critical in being "socially wise" in order to achieve desirable outcomes (Yamagishi and Suzuki, 2009). In this respect, perceptions of the descriptive norms in the environment become a default strategy used in various situations without conscious calculation in order to avoid making errors that can result in negative evaluations (Yamagishi,
Hashimoto, and Schug, 2008; Yamagishi, 2010). Moreover, when people collectively act on the descriptive norms they perceive in their environment, descriptive norms become self-sustaining (Aoki, 2001; Yamagishi, 2010), creating and reinforcing the very ecological niche to which individuals are responding.

In what follows we contrast two very different ecological niches in the United States and East Asia and different default negotiation strategies that are adaptive therein. For ease of theoretical exposition, we treat these ecologies broadly and later return to the cultural variation in each of these contexts. A broader implication of our analysis is that what is rational in one culture need not be rational in another, depending on the ecological match. After reviewing empirical support for these notions, we then discuss the theoretical and empirical implications of this view of culture and negotiation and conclude with important areas for future research within this perspective.

**The American Ecological Niche**

Research on negotiation has been conducted primarily on WEIRD samples that we would argue are operating within, responding to, and ultimately reinforcing a unique ecocultural niche. More specifically, WEIRD samples, particularly American samples on which the science and practice of negotiation are built, are in a social niche of a specific constellation of practices that emphasize being unique and better than others (individualism), wherein there is a wide range of behavior deemed permissible, a high tolerance of deviance (looseness), and a cultural expectation that theoretically all are created equal and can challenge the status quo (egalitarianism). These values and practices are mutually reinforced though the microstructural contexts, or constraints and affordances found in everyday situations. In particular, American samples tend to operate in everyday contexts wherein there are uniplex and weak social ties (Morris, Poldony, and Ariel, 2000), high relational, job, and residential mobility (Oishi, 2010; Schug, Yuki, and Maddux, 2010, Schug, Yuki, Horikawa, and Yakemura, 2009), and weak everyday situations (Gelfand et al., 2011), all of which reinforces and sustains individualism, looseness, and egalitarianism. In addition, American samples tend to exist in a more macrocontext characterized by low population density, high degrees of resources, and low degrees of national threats (Gelfand et al., 2011), all of which reinforce the latitude that exists.

This ecological niche of American samples affords and constrains a default strategy in negotiations that could be referred to as the individuals’ asserting and maximizing self-interest strategy (IAMS; Hashimoto & Yamagishi, 2009). The IAMS in negotiation assumes that individuals believe that they are supposed to “be all they can be”—to stand out, be unique, express one’s self, and promote one’s self-interest, often through competition. It assumes that people are able to enter
and exit social relationships with relative ease—to have swift trust and to de-personalize situations (e.g., to “separate the people from the problem,” Fisher and Ury, 1989). The strategy also assumes that it is rational to change partners if one can amass greater objective economic capital in other relationships. Importantly, these assumptions are perfectly rational in the context of the ecological niche in which these samples navigate. It is not necessarily the case that people personally value such behaviors; rather these behaviors are viewed as default negotiation strategies that are calibrated to fit with the perceived collective values, beliefs, and behaviors used by others. These “socially wise behaviors” also reinforce the very ecological niche to which negotiators are responding (Yamagishi, 2011).

**Negotiation Behavior Reflective of the IAMS Strategy**

The IAMS default strategy is highly consistent with a large literature that has identified numerous cognitive and motivational biases all in service of a competitive and economic motivation among American negotiators. For example, just as American samples tend to engage in self-enhancement—believe that they are better than others—in terms of fairness (Messick, Bloom, Boldizar, and Samuelson, 1985), competence (Yan and Gaier, 1994), success (Urban and Witt, 1990), and social responsibility (White and Plous, 1995), among many attributes, negotiators in this context also tend to have self-serving biases. In an early study, Neale and Bazerman (1983) found that most people unrealistically believed their proposal superior to that of their counterparts and that an arbitrator would favor their proposal. Kramer, Newton, and Pommerehne (1993) later found that negotiators in the United States had overly positive evaluations of themselves as compared with their evaluations of their counterparts (e.g., they believed they were more fair, trustworthy, and cooperative) and that the magnitude of such biases was related to the strength of the conflict (see also Thompson and Loewenstein, 1992). Self-serving biases are not limited to the laboratory. In the field, self-serving biases among professional negotiators are related to impasses (Loewenstein, Issacharoff, Camerer, and Babcock, 1993), length of strikes (Babcock, Wang, and Loewenstein, 1996), and reduced problem solving and feelings of frustration (De Dreu, Nauta, and Van de Vliert, 1995). Self-enhancement is also found with respect to the tendency to evaluate an object more favorably if one is in possession of it, or what has been called the mere ownership effect (Nesselroade, Beggin, and Allison, 1999), a bias that often occurs because people extend their self-identity to the items they own (Beggan, 1992). In American negotiation contexts, individuals tend to develop ownership of their positions and view opposition to their positions as threats to the self (De Dreu and Van Knippenberg, 2005), which leads to competitive negotiation processes. Negotiators’ self-enhancement can also be seen in their reactive devaluation of others’ concessions and in assuming that their own concessions are of higher value than others’ (Ross and Stillinger, 1991).

Other competitive negotiator biases also reflect the IAMS default strategy among American samples. Negotiators assume negotiations to be a fixed-pie and
zero-sum situation (Bazerman and Neale, 1983; Pruitt, 1981; Pruitt and Lewis, 1975; Schelling, 1960), which occurs when negotiators erroneously perceive their opponent’s interests to be opposite to their own (Bazerman and Neale, 1983; Larrick and Wu, 2007; Thompson and Hastie, 1990). This bias occurs when negotiations are framed as a game with a winner and a loser, like in sports, as opposed to a collaborative undertaking, like joint problem solving (Pinkley, 1990). This bias is so persistent and difficult to change that even when negotiators are provided with full information illustrating that the interests of the parties are not diametrically opposed, American negotiators still apply a win-lose frame (Pinkley and Northcraft, 1994). Other competitive attributional biases, such as explaining others’ behaviors as a result of their personality, for example, disagreeableness or emotional stability, are also found widely among Western samples (Morris, Larrick, and Su, 1999). Consistent with the IAMS default strategy among Americans, asking negotiators to take the perspective of the other negotiator actually exacerbates attribution biases in competitive contexts because negotiators assume that others would behave competitively and egocentrically (Epley, Caruso, and Bazerman, 2006).

Research on negotiators’ expectations shows a clear link between the expectation of competition and self-interest and Americans’ own strategies and how those expectations can ultimately have negative implications for negotiation outcomes. For example, in the absence of other information (i.e., the default strategy), negotiators assume that others (e.g., their constituents) want them to behave competitively. This notion was particularly apparent in a study by Benton and Druckman (1974) wherein negotiators either represented their own interests or were accountable to constituents. In the latter condition, negotiators were either given cooperative instructions, competitive instructions, or no instructions. The results demonstrated that negotiators who were given no instructions negotiated in a similar way to those representatives who were given competitive instructions and had more competitive goals and rejected more offers. Other research has illustrated that accountability to constituents enhances contentious tactics and makes it more difficult to reach integrative agreements (Benton, 1971; Ben-Yoav and Pruitt, 1984; Carnevale, Pruitt, and Britton, 1979; Carnevale, Pruitt, and Selheimer, 1981; Gruder, 1971; Klimoski, 1972; Klimoski and Ash, 1974; Neale, 1984). Expectations about others being competitive also makes negotiators much more competitive (Dickmann, Tenbunsel, and Galinsky, 2003; Tinsley, O’Connor, and Sullivan, 2002).

The IAMS is also reflected in how negotiators approach communication and enter into and exit from social relationships. In an ecocultural social niche characterized by weak social ties, high job, residential, and relational mobility, and more generally, much lower structural constraint, American negotiators are able to enter into relationships with relative ease and tend to develop high levels of generalized trust (Bohnet, Grieg, Hermann, and Zeckhauser, 2008; Gunia, Brett, Nandekolyar, and Kandar, 2011; Yamagishi, Cook, and Watabe, 1998; Yamagishi and Yamagishi, 1994). Once in a relationship, they tend to direct and forthright communication styles, wherein meaning is made highly explicit (Gibson, 1998; Gudykunst, et al.,
1996; Hall, 1976). Research has consistently demonstrated that American negotiators tend to share information directly (e.g., through questions about preferences and discussions of interests), strategies that require generalized trust. Direct information-sharing strategies—proverbially “cutting to the chase” and “not beating around the bush”—have long been theorized in the negotiation literature to result in higher outcomes (Pruitt and Lewis, 1975) which has been confirmed in numerous studies among Americans (Adair, Okimura, and Brett, 2001; Olekalns and Smith, 2000, 2003; Olekalns, Smith, and Walsh, 1996; Putnam and Wilson, 1989; Weingart, Hyder, and Prietula 1996; Weingart, Thompson, Bazerman, and Carroll, 1990; but see below for alternative default strategies and how they are associated with joint gain in other cultural contexts).

Others have long noted that Americans assume that direct talk and even confrontation is effective in negotiations, particularly compared to other conflict strategies such as avoidance or withdrawal, which are viewed rather negatively (De Dreu, Weingart, and Kwon, 2000; Montoya-Weiss and Song, 2001; Moore, 1986; Shapiro and Kulik 2004). Consistent with a direct, confrontational model, individuals in the United States and other Western nations prefer to resolve conflicts using their own expertise and training (Smith, Dugan, Peterson, and Leung, 1998), prefer forcing conflict resolution styles (Holt and DeVore, 2005), and tend to focus on directly integrating interests (Tinsley, 1998; 2001). Even direct expressions of one’s anger are seen as a strategic tactic in negotiation, particularly when the anger is directed toward the opponents’ behavior (Steinel, Van Kleef, and Harinck, 2008). In short, the default strategy among American samples is generally to be direct, confrontational, and to express one’s emotions and interests that reflect the descriptive norms of individualism, looseness, and egalitarianism and the social structures of open and low-density social networks.

Finally, the IAMS default strategy among Americans is generally oriented toward the achievement of economic capital (e.g., objective value) as compared to relational capital (e.g., subjective value) (Curhan, Elfenbein, and Xu, 2006; Gelfand, Smith Major, Raver, Nishii, and O’Brien, 2006). It should come as little surprise that the theoretical and empirical focus of much of the negotiation literature—which has been developed in the West as noted above—focuses on individual and joint economic gains as the criteria of choice for “successful” negotiations. For decades, the outcome of choice in negotiation experiments has been the “points gained,” and it is only recently that there have been measures developed to assess subjective value or satisfaction with relationships, trust, and commitment developed at the negotiation table (Curhan et al., 2006; Gelfand et al., 2006). American samples highly prize economic gains; for example, satisfaction is related to maximizing economic gains among US samples (Ma et al., 2002; Tinsley and Pillutla, 1998), and “success” is generally perceived to be related to high task orientation and low socioemotional behaviors (Sanchez-Burks, Nisbett, and Ybarra, 2000). The importance of maximizing economic capital is wholly consistent with the descriptive norms of many Western cultures wherein individuals can affirm conceptions of themselves as achievers (Schwartz, 1994) who through their own enterprise and
personal attributes are able to extract value for themselves. As noted by Brett and Gelfand (2006), accumulating economic capital in negotiation also verifies the independent self in that its accomplishment provides feedback against the individualists' self-interested goals. The importance of economic over relational capital is also consistent with the open and highly mobile relational structures in American society wherein people enter into and exit relationships much more frequently than in other cultural contexts and thus can be seen as rational in this ecocultural niche.

Negotiation data from American samples generally illustrates an IAMS that is rational in the particular ecological niche of these samples. The IAMS strategy is not necessarily used in all situations—it is a default strategy that has high ecological validity in general, yet situational requirements might change the strategy used among American samples (e.g., when family members negotiate with each other). We would also suggest that much of the negotiation research previously cited that reflects this strategy is largely drawn primarily from middle-class, white, highly educated American samples, and thus the generalizability of the IAMS to other subpopulations within the United States is questionable. For example, research on the psychology of gender in negotiation (within the United States) generally reveals default strategies that are less competitive and more relational than the mainstream negotiation findings discussed above (see Bowles and McGinn, 2008; Gelfand et al., 2006). Likewise, research on individuals in lower socioeconomic stratum illustrates psychological and social processes that are much more interdependent and relational in studies both in the field (Kohn, 1969) and the laboratory (Stephens, Markus, and Townsend, 2007; Stephens, Fryberg, and Markus, 2011), raising the question of whether the IAMS is applicable to these groups. More generally, to the extent that there are differences in ecocultural niches and associated values, norms and differences in everyday microstructural environments among men versus women, low versus high socioeconomic status, among other groups (e.g., regions such as the North versus the South), one might find different negotiation default strategies that develop. Although research on negotiation generally implicitly assumes that the IAMS applies universally, there is a question as to how narrow of a slice of human behavior these behaviors apply, even in the United States.

THE EAST ASIAN ECOCULTURAL NICHE

With this backdrop in mind, it is instructive to compare the wealth of negotiation data on American samples to what exists on other non-Western samples. Existing evidence, primarily on East Asian samples, illustrates that they are operating within, responding to, and ultimately reinforcing a very different ecological niche. In contrast to the American ecological niche, individuals in East Asian collectively
expect that the individual subjugates their interests to those of the group (collectivism, Triandis and Gelfand, 1998), there is high sanctioning of deviant behavior (tightness, Gelfand et al., 2011; Pelto, 1968), and there is a fixed hierarchy within which one must coordinate and fulfill duties and obligations (hierarchy, or high-power distance, Hofstede, 1980; Schwartz, 1994). These collective values are mutually reinforced and afforded through everyday microstructural constraints. In particular, East Asian samples tend to operate in everyday contexts in which they are embedded in strong, multiplex social networks (Morris et al., 2000); have low relational, job, and residential mobility (wherein people do not change relationship partners, job, and residences with great frequency; Oishi, 2010; Schug et al., 2009, 2010); and navigate contexts in which there is high situational constraint (Gelfand et al., 2011). The more macrocontext of East Asian samples is, in general, characterized by higher population density, lower degrees of resources, and higher degrees of national threats (Gelfand et al., 2011), which reinforce the constraint that exists within such niches.

In contrast to the IAMS of American samples, the highly constrained ecocultural niche of East Asian samples affords a default strategy that could be referred to as the not to offend others strategy (NOOS; Hashimoto and Yamagishi, 2009). The NOOS departs in numerous ways from the IAMS in its assumptions about what is “socially wise.” It assumes at its basis that individuals’ behavior should be calibrated with the duties and expectations of the group; that one should be modest and avoid behaviors that threaten one’s reputation (particularly in low-mobility contexts in which one cannot enter and exit relationships easily) which could result in ostracism, the ultimate “psychological death”; that developing trust, particularly with strangers, is “dangerous” and takes much more time given strong ingroup-outgroup distinctions. The NOOS assumes that relational capital, as compared to just economic capital, is of prime importance for securing the loyalty and commitment of negotiation partners in contexts in which there is low mobility, closed networks, and high constraint. As with the IAMS, these assumptions are perfectly rational in the context of the ecological niche in which these negotiators navigate; and as with the IAMS, the behaviors reinforce the very ecological niche to which negotiators are responding (Yamagishi, 2010; see also Chiu et al., 2010).

**Negotiation behavior reflective of the NOOS**

Negotiation research over the last decade illustrates that East Asian negotiators’ cognitions and behaviors depart considerably from the IAMS and are more reflective of a default NOOS. For example, the Japanese have been shown to construe conflict episodes as reflective of duties and obligations (giri), whereas Americans view the same conflicts as being focused on violations of rights. Unlike research
on negotiator cognition among American samples where self-enhancement is a rationally calibrated strategy to the ecocultural niche in which one seeks to distinguish oneself from others, negotiators in the East Asian and non-Western cultures are much less likely to be prone to self-enhancement as a default strategy. For example, Gelfand et al. (2002) argued that positively self-serving biases of fairness in negotiation are more rational within individualistic cultures, whereas these biases are socially unwise and disruptive in the ecocultural niche in collectivistic cultures, in which the self is served by focusing on one’s negative characteristics in order to “blend in” and maintain interdependence with others (Heine, Lehman, Markus, and Kitayama, 1999). They found that Americans were much more likely than Japanese to associate themselves with fair behavior and others with unfair behavior; were more likely to believe an “objective” third party would view their own behavior as more fair in a real world conflict; and were more likely to believe that they were more fair going into a negotiation, causing much lower joint gain (see also Wade-Benzoni et al., 2002). Others have likewise shown that people use different criteria in forming fairness judgments in negotiation in the United States and Japan that are consistent with the IAMS and NOOS, respectively. Buchan, Croson, and Johnson (2004) for example found that Americans negotiators based their fairness assessments on their power over others (e.g., their BATNAs, or best alternative to negotiated agreement or BATNAs), whereas Japanese based their fairness assessments on their obligations to others. In all, what is perceived as fair in negotiations varies across cultures dependent on the ecological niche in which negotiators are embedded.

Research has also shown that competitive biases, such as fixed-pie biases (Gelfand and Christakopoulou, 1999), endowment effects (Maddux et al., 2010), and attributional biases, are less likely to characterize default responses in negotiation among East Asian samples. For example, the disposition bias, so robust among American participants that it was designated the fundamental attribution error, is less common among East Asians for whom the concept of the individual person as a conscious agent is less common. In negotiation contexts, research has illustrated that negotiators in South Korea and Hong Kong make fewer internal attributions and more situational attributions about their counterparts’ behavior than negotiators in the United States (Morris, Leung, and Iyengar, 2004; Valenzuela, Srivastava, and Lee, 2005). More generally, these results illustrate that judgment biases in negotiation need not be universal shortcuts but rather can reflect different strategies that negotiators have internalized as adaptations to particular ecological niches.

Research on negotiators’ expectations also shows that East Asian and other non-Western samples reflect a NOOS as compared to the IAMS that is more pervasive in the West. For example, unlike previous research on Western samples, Gelfand and Realo (1999) found that collectivistic samples react much differently to accountability pressures from their constituents. Whereas individualists assume that their constituencies want them to be competitive (Benton and Druckman, 1973; Gruder, 1971) and accordingly, accountability activates competition, among collectivists, accountability activates cooperative construals and behaviors in
negotiations. These effects are reversed in unaccountable negotiations, when in effect, negotiators are released from normative pressures to do what is expected. In unaccountable conditions, collectivists are more competitive than individualists. These results are similar to other studies run in Japan that showed that Japanese respondents engage in much more cooperative behavior in social dilemma contexts when they are monitored and yet engage in much more competitive behavior when they are not being monitored (see also Kachelmeier and Shehata, 1997). More generally, these results indicate that monitoring of behavior exacerbates the dominant cultural strategy, whereas the lack of monitoring releases negotiators from the default strategy.

The NOOS is also reflective of the specific ways in which negotiators approach communication and enter exit social relationships among East Asian negotiations. In an ecological niche characterized by strong social ties; very low job, residential, and relational mobility; and high constraint in everyday situations, East Asian and other non-Western samples have much lower generalized trust with strangers (Bohnert et al., 2008; Gunia, et al., 2011; Realo, Allik, and Greenfield, 2008; Triandis, McCusker, and Hui, 1990; Yamagishi, et al., 1998; Yamagishi and Yamagishi, 1994) and are highly vigilant to the potential for trust violations (Branzei, Vertinsky, and Camp, 2007; Fulmer and Gelfand, 2010). The cultural basis of trust varies across the NOOS and IAMS that are generally adaptive to their respective ecological niches: People from highly collectivistic contexts prefer situational information and interpersonal ties, while individualists prefer dispositional information and common category membership (Branzei et al., 2007; Yuki, Maddux, Brewer, and Takemura, 2005). Within relationships, East Asians tend to use indirect communication strategies that reflect the NOOS (Gibson, 1998; Gudykust et al., 1996; Hall, 1976) wherein the meaning is highly implicit and found in the context. In contrast with American samples, East Asian negotiators tend to share information indirectly in negotiation through the proposals that are exchanged over time as compared to direct information about their underlying interests, and such sophisticated inferential search routines are highly effective in identifying joint gain in these contexts (Adair, 2004; Adair et al., 2001; Adair and Brett, 2005; Rosette, Brett, Barness, and Lytle, in press). By making proposals—invoking both single and multiple issues—one can draw inferences about the other parties’ priorities from the patterning of proposals and counterproposals without the vulnerability of revealing specific information about one’s interests. Indirect communication also serves another vital function in negotiations in that it helps the participant avoid losing one’s or another’s face by saying or doing something that is seen as inappropriate. Direct expressions of emotion, particularly negative emotions (e.g., anger) or disconnecting emotions (e.g., pride), are avoided in the NOOS. As compared to Western contexts, East Asian negotiators are less likely to accept an offer from an opponent who displays negative emotions (Fulmer, Gelfand, Salmon, Van Klee, and Hajo, 2011; Hajo, Shirako, and Maddux, 2010, Kopelman and Rosette, 2008). More generally, suppressing one’s true emotions is adaptive within the context of NOOS contexts and necessitates a sophisticated decoding of others’ true emotions.
For example, Yuki, Maddux, and Masuda (2007) showed that, because Asians normally subdue their emotional expressions, they tend to focus on the eyes, the most uncontrollable part of the face in terms of displaying emotion, in interpreting others' true-felt emotion. On the other hand, they found that Americans, who normally express their true emotions, tend to focus on the mouth, the most expressive part of the facial expression in interpreting others' emotion.

In contrast to the "let's talk" approach, the assumption that not talking is good predominates in East Asia, where Buddhist and Taoist philosophies advocate silence, meditation, and internal visualization for achieving high levels of thinking (Kim, 2002). This is manifested in negotiations; as compared to the West, individuals in collectivistic cultures view avoidance and withdrawal as more effective for conflict management (Holt and DeVore, 2005; Morris et al., 1998; Oetzel et al., 2001) and confrontational strategies as less effective (Friedman, Chi, and Liu, 2006). In contrast to the West, avoidance can have positive connotations and reflect a concern for others rather than a lack of concern for others as prescribed from the dual concern model (Pruitt, 1983; Pruitt and Rubin, 1986; see Gabrielidis et al., 1997; Tjosvold & Sun, 2002). The preference for avoidance is even stronger in conflict contexts wherein there is high constraint, including in disputes with ingroup members (Chan and Goto, 2003; Pearson and Stephan, 1998), and with superiors (Brew and Cairns, 2004; Friedman et al., 2006). Other indirect strategies for managing conflict that are consistent with the NOOS—as compared to direct talk and discussion—including triadic management (involving third parties to help manage conflicts; Lebra, 1984; Leung, 1987), anticipatory management (i.e., preventing a conflict from occurring in the first place), and situational code switching (being cordial only when the situation calls for it).

**Implications of Culture for Future Negotiation Research**

Despite its universality, the management of conflict is highly culture specific. Over the last several decades, there has been an explosion of work on negotiation that has illuminated the basic psychological and social processes that transpire at the negotiation and their implications for negotiation outcomes (Gelfand, et al., 2010; Thompson et al., 2010). Nevertheless, the scholarly enterprise on this topic has been highly narrow in its empirical scope, being conducted by and about WEIRD (and primarily American) people, who we have argued are embedded in a unique ecological niche that renders a certain cluster of negotiation strategies—in particular the IAMS. The IAMS is ecologically adaptive to the low-constraint, high-mobility, and weak networks that generally characterize Western, particularly American, samples. We discussed a different, though equally ecologically rational, strategy—the NOOS—which is much more adaptive to the high-constraint,
low-mobility, and strong networks that characterize other samples, most notably East Asian ones.

We conclude with a number of implications for future research. First, as it is obvious from this chapter, we know little about the default strategies that are ecologically valid or commonly observed in contexts beyond the West and East Asia. Research is sorely needed on the ecocultural niches and default negotiation strategies in other non-Western nations (including in the Middle East, South America, and Africa), which at the moment constitute collectively 2 percent of the research in the field.

Future research is also needed on other Western cultures to break the cultural hegemony assumptions about the West. Western nations vary also on their degree and type of individualism (e.g., horizontal versus vertical individualism; Triandis and Gelfand, 1998), the strength of social networks, and the degree of latitude versus constraint (Gelfand et al., 2011). Within the United States, there is a great need to understand default strategies across different socioeconomic regional, ethnic, racial, and gender groups. Research that examines the principles discussed in this chapter—how mutual expectations and descriptive norms based on particular ecological niches afford and constrain certain strategies and how behavior collectively reinforces the ecological niche in turn—will help to understand why there are cultural differences across groups that are different but ecologically rational in their own right.

Finally, a significant amount of research is needed on the situational dynamics of default negotiation strategies in different cultural contexts. Implicit in our perspective is that negotiators have an “adaptive toolbox” (Gigerenzer and Selton, 2000) from which they choose strategies. While we have contrasted the IAMS and NOOS as default strategies used generally because they are ecologically rational in the United States and East Asia in general, respectively, it is critical to note that neither strategy is necessarily used in all situations. When situational requirements change, strategies can also change accordingly in any culture. In this respect, default strategies are cognitive shortcuts that are generally adaptive; however, they are not deterministic and can change dramatically depending on the context.

For example, situational factors, particularly those that release actors from the constraints of following descriptive norms, can produce behavior that is counter-normative. Low-accountability negotiations free individuals from the pressures to abide by cultural norms, and research has found cultural reversals (e.g., people in individualistic environments being more cooperative, people in collectivistic environments being more competitive; Gelfand and Realo, 1999; Yamagishi, 1988). Other research has similarly shown that, when the individuals are held responsible to an ingroup audience for their behavioral choices (Briley et al., 2000), their behavior is more culturally normative.

Situations in which reputational concerns are salient also exacerbate the influence of descriptive norms on behavior. For example, Yamagishi and Suzuki (2009) showed that when individuals expect that others can share reputational information about each other, Japanese were much more likely to report being interdependent
(see also Chen, Chiu, and Chan, 2009). Situations also release people from behaving according to descriptive norms when there is no common knowledge about with whom one is negotiating. Mifune and Yamagishi (2008) found that, when group membership is not made public, Japanese are more motivated to behave in a self-serving way; rather, it is the mutual knowledge of shared group membership that is required to ensure that group members treat one another altruistically. Likewise, Yamagishi, Hashimoto, and Schug (2008) found that Japanese patterns of conformity were drastically reduced when they were in situations in which they did not need to take others' evaluations into consideration. The communication medium can also enable individuals to be released from the default strategies in one's culture. For example, Rosette, Brett, Barsness, and Lytle (in press) found that Hong Kong Chinese were more aggressive in lean media such as e-mail where there are fewer constraints.

Finally, there is a critical need to understand the conditions under which negotiators use different strategies in intercultural negotiations contexts. With some exceptions (Adair et al., 2001; Adler and Graham, 1989; Brett and Okumura, 1998; Imai and Gelfand, 2010; Natlandsmyr and Rognes, 1995), the vast majority of research discussed in this chapter is based on intracultural comparisons rather than dynamics at the cross-cultural interface. Commenting on this scientific state of affairs, Kray (2005) noted that "although researchers have identified a host of cross-cultural differences in styles and preferences, negotiation scholars might consider expanding beyond simple demonstrations of differences...and explore whether awareness of these differences makes a difference...knowledge about factors influencing the effectiveness of intercultural negotiations is sparse" (159).

Within the current perspective, it is possible that cultural clashes in intercultural negotiation result from the misadaptation of default strategies to ecocultural niches that are no longer supportive of such strategies. Decision theorists have long argued that rules that are derived from people's everyday experience (and thus have much ecological rationality) and/or are firmly held (e.g., have been applicable in a certain ecology) are applied more consistently than other rules (Evans, 2008). Intercultural negotiations, given their high degrees of uncertainty, ambiguity, and stress—factors that have been shown to affect the reliance of one's own cultural tendencies (Kashima, Halloran, Yuki, and Kashima, 2004; Morris et al., 2004)—might cause default strategies to be used frequently. However, it is not necessarily the case that individuals blindly apply default strategies useful in their own ecocultural niche to intercultural negotiations. Theories and research that look at the situational and personality factors that cause negotiators to adapt their strategies in intercultural situations are sorely needed. For example, individuals who are high in cultural intelligence and/or have many different cultural experiences are more likely to have a keen understanding of the strategies that are seen as ecologically valid in other cultures and be better able to adapt their own strategies.

The importance of understanding the factors that facilitate or inhibit intercultural negotiations cannot be overstated. Negotiations in the twenty-first century
are much more complex; they are wired, they are global, they are networked, and they occur in increasingly flattened and fluid organizational structures. In this brave new negotiation world, being able to negotiate effectively across cultures is a crucial aspect of many interorganizational relationships, including mergers and acquisitions, joint ventures, and sales of products and services (Adler, 2002). The need to negotiate effectively across cultures is also painfully obvious in today's geopolitical scene, where the source of conflict among humankind is thought to be increasingly cultural in nature (Huntington, 1996) and where one's ability to negotiate in other cultures is arguably a matter of life and death. Thus, the study of intercultural negotiations is of critical importance not only for the science of negotiation but also its practice.

In a world of increasing global opportunities and threats, it is of critical theoretical importance to understand how people manage their interdependence. Our perspective has highlighted that cultural differences in negotiation can be seen as ecologically rational default negotiation strategies that are adaptive in particular social niches and that can change dynamically depending on the context. By moving beyond a WEIRD sample, we not only get a window into other cultures and their rationalities but into the particular logic of our own negotiation strategies and why and how they have been sustained in a particular ecological niche.

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1. One might argue that, given that WEIRD people are the ones who control many of the globe's resources, having 95 percent of the research involving them is reasonable. However, psychologists are interested in understanding and predicting human behavior, not just understanding those who are in control, making this argument untenable for only studying WEIRD people in psychology.

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